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THE PROCEDURE OF ELECTION LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS
Joshua A. Douglas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most federal court cases take a typical path: a district judge initially decides
the dispute, and the losing party can appeal to the circuit court, which sits in threejudge panels.1 The losing party at the court of appeals can either ask the full en
banc circuit court to rehear the case or seek certiorari review at the United States
Supreme Court.2
Election law cases are different. Although some cases take the traditional
three-tiered path described above,3 Congress has enacted special procedures for
many other types of cases. In litigation involving the Voting Rights Act, certain
aspects of campaign finance, and redistricting, a three-judge district court
comprised of both appellate and district judges initially hears the dispute, and the
Supreme Court is required to review any appeal.4 For other campaign finance
cases, Congress has enacted a particularly unique procedure in which a single
district judge certifies constitutional challenges to the full en banc circuit court,
thereby skipping the three-judge appellate stage altogether.5
In the past few years, the Supreme Court has considered several election law
cases arising under these different congressionally-mandated procedures. For
example, the process by which the Court rejected a constitutional attack to the
Voting Rights Act6 was quite different from the procedure that gave rise to the
Court’s decision upholding Indiana’s voter identification law.7 Similarly, although
the substantive holding of the Court’s recent campaign finance decision in Citizens
United v. FEC8 has generated widespread commentary,9 there has been little
examination of the procedural posture of that case. These varying processes have a
*
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1
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(c), 132(c), 1291, 1294, 1331 (2006).
2
See id. §§ 46(c), 1254(1).
3
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187–88 (2008).
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-2, 1973c (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a); Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113–14.
5
2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006).
6
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2509–10 (2009).
7
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 187–88.
8
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
9
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.
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dramatic effect on the scope of election law litigation because they influence the
manner in which courts dissect the issues, thus contributing to the substantive
analysis.10
The Supreme Court famously declared that the right to vote is “preservative
of other basic civil and political rights,”11 which may explain why Congress has
created special procedures for election law cases. Courts are often asked to decide
the winner of an election,12 and these winners enact laws under which we are
governed. Election law cases therefore play a fundamental role in shaping our
democracy. Courts also have a profound impact on election administration.
Whether it is through construing the Voting Rights Act,13 deciding the proper
scope of campaign finance regulations,14 or analyzing the constitutionality of an
election law,15 federal courts are at the forefront of shaping our political process.
Additionally, even though courts play a significant role in protecting
fundamental rights, including the right to vote,16 there is heightened concern when
courts enter the political fray because the judiciary is the least democratic branch
of government.17 Thus, there is an inherent tension between the desire to leave the
judiciary out of the political process and the courts’ obligation to protect voting
rights. Any election law decision implicitly calls into question the legitimacy of the
courts’ power to render a judgment in this area. This tension requires a greater
need to scrutinize the way in which courts are involved in election law disputes.
Election law scholars, however, have paid scant attention to the different
procedures by which courts decide election law cases. Further, there has been little
exploration of the reasons why certain processes exist, and there is even less
discussion of which procedures are best for election law cases. One commentator
has advocated for state legislatures to define clearly certain procedural matters for
election contests, including: “(1) who can be a contestant; (2) what standard of
evidence to require; and (3) how to expedite contests.”18 But there are more
10

See infra Part III.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
12
See, e.g., Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010) (deciding the 2010
Alaska U.S. Senate election); Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009) (per
curiam) (deciding the 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate election).
13
See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2510
(2009).
14
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
15
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187–88 (2008).
16
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 96–100
(2009).
17
See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, The Use of Policy in Judicial Reasoning: A
Reconceptualization Before and After Bush v. Gore, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 46
(2002) (“By stopping the electoral process, the Supreme Court, our least democratic branch
of government, made a major inroad into a political matter that Congress and the people
had jointly reserved for themselves (Congress through federal statutes and the people
through the federal Constitution).” (citation omitted)).
18
Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265, 311
(2007).
11

2011]

PROCEDURE OF ELECTION LAW

435

fundamental and foundational questions: What goals are we trying to achieve in
enacting special procedures for election law? Do the current processes meet these
goals? If not, what modifications are necessary?
This Article answers those questions, proceeding in four Parts. Part II
identifies the values and features we should strive to promote in creating a special
procedure for election law cases: timeliness, accuracy, legitimacy, minimization of
ideology, preservation of proper judicial roles (judicial economy), and signaling. If
we are going to have specific processes unique to election law cases, these
processes should be based on sound principles. Part III examines federal court
procedures for election law cases, describes the way in which federal courts hear
election law disputes, and evaluates these processes in light of the goals discussed
in Part II. Part IV advocates “merits-based direct en banc review” as a uniform
judicial procedure for election law cases in federal courts.19 Briefly stated, in this
system, a single trial judge must expedite discovery, resolve factual disputes, and
make a timely decision on the merits. The losing party then has a right to an
expedited appeal directly to the full en banc court for any nonfrivolous election
law questions. The en banc court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for
clear and convincing evidence (or a similar standard) and analyzes the legal
conclusions de novo.
Enacting merits-based direct en banc review will provide uniformity and
clarity to the judiciary’s role in affecting elections and their outcomes. It will also
meet many of the goals we should strive to achieve in creating a special procedure
for election law cases. Perhaps most important, if the federal judiciary is to remain
intimately involved in the election business, then merits-based direct en banc
review is the best procedure to sustain a robust democracy in which voters can
freely and fairly elect their leaders.
II. GOALS FOR A JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR ELECTION LAW CASES
Before evaluating how courts currently review election law cases, or
determining how courts should resolve election law disputes, it is important to
discern the values we should seek to promote in any judicial procedure for election
law. Congress has enacted special mechanisms for election law cases20 and
obviously believes that certain types of election law disputes are different from
other court cases. Thus, there would seem to be a reason to enact unique
procedures in this area of law; however, it is not clear how the various systems
Congress has promulgated actually relate to the goals we should strive to achieve
in resolving election law cases. That is, there is a disconnect between why election
19

State courts have a myriad of procedures for handling election law cases, and in
particular, election contests. See, e.g., BARRY H. WEINBERG, THE RESOLUTION OF
ELECTION DISPUTES: LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT CONTROL ELECTION CHALLENGES 1–2 (2d
ed. 2008) (discussing election contest procedures). An examination of these state court
procedures is beyond the scope of this article.
20
See infra Part III.
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law cases are so important and the structures under which courts render their
decisions.
This Part identifies six goals we should seek to promote in any special judicial
system for election law disputes: timeliness, accuracy, legitimacy, minimization of
ideology, preservation of proper judicial roles (judicial economy), and signaling.
Several of these ideals may conflict at times. For example, we may have to
sacrifice timeliness for accuracy, or vice versa. Others are interrelated; by
rendering an accurate decision, courts are likely to enjoy greater legitimacy in their
decision-making powers. After understanding why these ideals are important for
election law and determining if current procedures achieve these values, we can
then discern what type of process would best promote as many of these goals as
possible.21
Ultimately, promoting these goals will lead to the realization of an
overarching value inherent in a representative democracy: prompt, fair decisions
that structure elections in the most just manner possible and ensure the winner of
an election is the person who received the majority of votes through an equal and
fair process.22 At the same time, judicial procedures should ensure that litigants
feel they had a fair shot, and judicial rules must level the playing field for all
participants.23 Our democracy is founded upon the belief that everyone has an
equal chance to affect our government;24 any judicial process for election law cases
must also promote this value.
A. Timeliness
Elections require prompt certainty and finality in the result. That is, election
law disputes should not be drawn out affairs.25 Quick resolution helps to ensure
legitimacy for the outcome and promotes political accountability—particularly if
the case arises in the context of an upcoming election. Lack of timely certainty and
finality, by contrast, leads to an inability of candidates to campaign properly or
elected leaders to govern effectively.
It is particularly important to ensure timely resolution of election
administration disputes before an election so that the parties and the electorate
21

This list could serve to inform a discussion about the proper judicial resolution of
cases in other areas of law that may also deserve special attention. Thus, although this
Article focuses on election law, these principles have wide applicability.
22
See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 1–6 (1994) (discussing how the imposition of
“fair rules” can lead to just electoral outcomes).
23
See id. at 1 (“To me, fair play means that the rules encourage everyone to play.”).
24
See id. at 6.
25
See Mark Klock, Is it “The Will of the People” or a Broken Arrow? Collective
Preferences, Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing PostBalloting Litigation Absent Specific Allegations of Fraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 53
(2002) (noting that the main objective and social policy behind voting is to achieve the
“quick resolution of disagreement over who should have political power”).
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know how they may act within the political process.26 For example, candidates,
political parties, and advocacy groups must understand the proper scope of
campaign finance restrictions before a campaign season is in full swing. Similarly,
courts should resolve challenges to a state’s election regulations before the state
implements those laws in an election. As Justice Scalia has explained, election law
is an area in which “the dos and don’ts need to be known in advance of the
election.”27 Prompt adjudication serves the goal of providing clarity to the election
process.
With respect to election contests, the electorate more readily accepts the result
when there is quick resolution of a close election, instead of having the candidates
and their supporters dig in their heels in a drawn-out post-election dispute.28 As
one commentator explains,
Were temporal proximity not a priority, elections could be held well
ahead of time (much as in a monarchy the heir apparent may be selected
well in advance), which would provide ample opportunity for recounts,
contests, revotes, and the careful resolution of any issues that arise in an
election. Yet because the issues facing politicians are constantly
evolving, and because politicians may frequently change their stripes,
holding elections roughly contemporaneously with when the victors will
take office increases political accountability.29
Long judicial battles also require the courts (rather than “the people,” in the
view of many,30) to decide the outcome far removed from when the voters actually
made their choice. That is, courts need time to decide a post-election dispute, so
involving the judiciary necessarily increases the time between when a person votes
and when there is a definitive winner, which could call into question the sanctity of

26

This goal also counsels against applying the political question doctrine to disputes
involving election administration or voting rights, as it is more important for courts to
render timely decisions in this area. See JoAnn D. Kamuf, Note, “Should I Stay or Should I
Go?”: The Current State of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal for the
Future, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 202 (2005) (“The political question doctrine should not
control in the arena of election law, which is already highly regulated by the courts.”
(citation omitted)).
27
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 208 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation:
Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 937, 991–99 (2005).
28
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 292–93.
29
Id. at 292.
30
See, e.g., Krysta R. Edwards, Note, The Vote from beyond the Grave, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1583, 1605 (2010) (noting that some citizens “simply do[] not see the point
in voting when an election is decided by the courts rather than the people” (citation
omitted)).
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election administration.31 In other words, “[i]n an important sense, a speedy
determination of an election protects the integrity of the process.”32
Moreover, given that some offices have short terms (such as two years for
members of Congress),33 it makes sense to resolve any disputes quickly so that the
person elected can begin the job of governing. Even if the person is a low-level
official or merely one member of a larger body, his or her constituents will suffer a
lack of representation every day that an election contest drags on. For example, the
court battle between Norm Coleman and Al Franken for the 2008 Minnesota
Senate seat lasted several months after the winner was supposed to take office,
meaning that the citizens of Minnesota had only one U.S. Senator during the time
it took the Minnesota courts to resolve the election dispute.34 The process could
have dragged on even longer if Coleman had continued his battle in federal court.35
Similarly, Hamilton County, Ohio, was required to use a former judge to
temporarily fill a vacancy on the juvenile court while the federal and state courts
sorted out an election contest between the candidates for that position.36
It follows that post-election legal battles deserve quick adjudication. Surely,
anyone involved in a legal dispute will argue that their area of law deserves
efficiency and finality. But from a societal and normative perspective, election law
presents special reasons to elevate the goal of timeliness.37 Quick adjudication
helps to promote integrity in the electoral process and legitimacy of elected
officials.38 It also allows elected officials to govern, as opposed to being mired in
legal challenges. Thus, any special procedure for resolving election law cases
should include a goal of quick decision making in reaching a final resolution.
Simply directing judges to decide cases promptly or put election contests at the
31

See Huefner, supra note 18, at 293.
Id. (citation omitted).
33
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”).
34
See Mike Kaszuba & Pat Doyle, How Long Will Minnesota Be a Senator Short?,
STARTRIBUNE, http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/36785544.html (last updated Dec.
28, 2008); see also Edward B. Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed
2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129 (2011).
35
See Richard L. Hasen, Franken’s Monster: Will Bush v. Gore Bite Democrats in
Coleman v. Franken?, SLATE (Mar. 18, 2009, 2:07 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/
2214074/pagenum/all/#p2.
36
Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 245 (6th Cir. 2011).
37
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 314–15 (“Election contests need to be both
commenced and concluded as expeditiously as possible.”). Timeliness is particularly
important for new or struggling democracies to ensure a peaceful end to an election
dispute. See Oren Ipp & Terence F. Hoverter, Identifying International Principles for
Resolving Election Disputes, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 829, 835 (2005). The key principles for
resolution of international post-election disputes are: (1) the right to file a complaint, (2) an
impartial arbiter, (3) timely resolution of disputes, (4) effective, appropriate, and
enforceable remedies, and (5) transparent and accessible procedures. Id. at 833–37.
38
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 293 (“[I]t is important that representatives serve with
full authority and respect, rather than with unresolved questions about their legitimacy.”).
32
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front of the docket is one way to achieve timeliness; however, as discussed below,
there are also structural mechanisms that can foster prompt adjudication. That is,
so long as Congress wishes to enact special procedures for election law cases, it
can include both structural means and aspirational directives to promote timeliness.
B. Accuracy
No one would dispute that court decisions involving election law should be
accurate. Elections are fair only if the rules governing them promote fairness and
accuracy, giving each side an equal opportunity for victory. A common
understanding of popular sovereignty recognizes election law “as a guarantor of
electoral accuracy and governmental legitimacy.”39 Certainly, a court case that
ultimately decides the election must be as accurate as possible in discerning the
will of the majority because the elected leader will likely not enjoy legitimacy if
the court proceeding that led to the victory was tainted.40 But election
administration cases also require accuracy to ensure that the electoral process
remains fair.
If a court is incorrect in a private contract dispute or a tort case, the parties
themselves will be aggrieved and the public may have a poor view of the courts.
But, as a whole, society will not necessarily suffer unless the rule somehow
negatively affects business transactions or has other widespread consequences
beyond that case. Moreover, the courts can eventually reverse their position on an
incorrect legal rule with little long-term implications. If, however, the courts are
wrong on a matter of election law, there are resulting widespread societal
concerns: e.g., the wrong person could be elected, citizens could be incorrectly
denied their right to vote, or improper influences could taint the election process.
Our democracy functions because we elect leaders to govern us.41 If those
leaders are elected using improper means or unfair rules, then they may not be able
to govern as effectively because they will not enjoy legitimacy among the
electorate.42 Moreover, the stakes in any election law case are necessarily high
39

James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular
Sovereignty under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 245 (1990)
(discussing this “Lockean-based” view of popular sovereignty).
40
See Joaquin G. Avila, The Washington 2004 Gubernatorial Election Crisis: The
Necessity of Restoring Public Confidence in the Electoral Process, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
313, 315 (2005) (“[T]he vibrancy of our body politic and the continued legitimacy of our
form of government rest upon the understanding that the electoral process will accurately
reflect the will of the people.”); see also Kevin J. Hickey, Note, Accuracy Counts: Illegal
Votes in Contested Elections and the Case for Complete Proportionate Deduction,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 167, 172 (2008) (“In short, the value of accuracy counsels that the final
tally should reflect the will of the electorate.”).
41
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7 (1980) (defining democracy as
“rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed”).
42
See Gardner, supra note 39, at 192 (“[E]lection laws and procedures necessarily
affect the legitimacy of an elected government by determining the extent to which election
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given that they impact political power and thus the authority to make laws that
affect all aspects of our society. Elections must enjoy the appearance of fairness
and equality, as these values infuse the theoretical backbone of our democracy and
provide legitimacy to those elected under judicial rules. Accuracy in election law
cases is thus paramount to achieve that notion of fairness.43 “When a court or other
tribunal acts to remedy an election irregularity, the public must be able both to
understand why the election failed and to accept how it will be fixed. The public
must also have confidence that it will be fixed fairly and not arbitrarily.”44
Courts place a premium on accuracy in all of their decisions. Election law
cases, however, have an even greater need for accuracy, meaning that legislatures
should enact structural mechanisms and create specific procedures to increase the
likelihood of accurate decision making.
C. Legitimacy
As a corollary to accuracy, courts must enjoy the public’s support in rendering
election law decisions. Elected leaders themselves will not enjoy legitimacy if the
courts that set out the rules under which politicians are elected are not perceived as
fair, unbiased, and competent to make decisions in this area.45 If courts are to
remain in the business of deciding election law disputes—and there is no
indication that they will remove themselves from the “political thicket”46—then
society must view the decisions as legitimate.47 Of course, there is an inherent
tension present, as any time a court decides a hotly contested election law case it
will open itself up to criticism of partisanship and overreaching simply based on
the subject matter involved.48 But if Congress decides that the federal courts must
results accurately reflect the consent of the governed.”). Thus, the goals of accuracy and
legitimacy of elected officials go hand in hand; without an accurate vote tally, the winner
will not enjoy legitimacy.
43
Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of
State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 344–45 (2008) (noting that, along with access, accuracy is one
of the key values “at the heart of a healthy democratic process”).
44
Huefner, supra note 18, at 291–92.
45
See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1051, 1060 n.33 (2010) (noting that a court that employs an “even-handed application
of the law . . . accordingly confers legitimacy on the declared winner of the election”).
46
See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for
Getting the Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667,
673–74, 698 (2002) (exploring various “exit strategies” for the Supreme Court to remove
itself from the political thicket but concluding that the Court is unlikely to stop deciding
election law cases anytime soon).
47
See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 45, at 1060 (“Courts that lack the public’s
confidence [regarding perceived partisanship] may not be able to resolve election disputes
authoritatively.”).
48
As Professor Rick Hasen notes, using the courts as part of a political strategy can
inherently undermine the legitimacy of both the court rendering the decision and the
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be involved in election law litigation, then it should also set up a structure that can
best preserve the courts’ legitimacy.
Legitimacy has two strands: legitimacy of the court in deciding election law
cases and legitimacy of elected officials.49 Further, one flows from the other: a
court’s legitimacy in analyzing election law rules can help lead to greater
legitimacy for candidates operating under those rules. That is, if the public views
courts that construe election law rules as legitimate, then the representatives
elected under those rules are also likely to enjoy legitimacy because the public will
perceive the process by which they are elected as fair. With respect to procedures
for election law court cases, then, courts must enjoy legitimacy for them to render
competent decisions that the public will accept.
As Professor Steven Huefner explains, a court decision that resolves a close
election must “be both fair and perceived as fair.”50 Part of ensuring this perception
of fundamental fairness is rooting out any bias of the decision makers and crafting
a system that encourages “[g]reater uniformity in recount and contest
procedures.”51 Litigants must feel that they have had a fair chance to make their
argument before an unbiased court and that the court will render its decision solely
based on the substantive merits of the case.52
elected official that the decision involves. See Hasen, supra note 27, at 993 (“Putting
judges in the position of deciding election law questions when the winner and loser of its
decision will be obvious can undermine the legitimacy of the courts. Moreover, when
judges second-guess decisions made by legislators and votes cast by the people, the
legitimacy of the election process itself can suffer.”). Justice Breyer expressed a similar
sentiment in his dissent in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting),
noting that a close election can “embroil[]” judges in partisan conflict and “undermin[e]
respect for the judicial process.”
49
See Hasen, supra note 27, at 993; cf. Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy”
in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1032–33 (2007) (explaining
that the Supreme Court is often concerned with the public’s perception of its decisions both
in terms of “legal” and “sociological” legitimacy).
50
Huefner, supra note 18, at 289.
51
Id. at 290.
52
Id. Professor Huefner continues:
Ensuring that the public perceives and accepts a remedy as fair is equally
important to the legitimacy of an election remedy. Public acceptance of the
process through which the system resolves election failures ultimately involves a
complex mix of overlapping factors that sometimes are in tension with each
other. For instance, the public not only must believe that the remedial system
treats both candidates and voters equally, but also must be confident that the
system will protect anonymous voting while allowing an accurate accounting of
the outcome.
Id.; see also Benjamin Handler, Abandoning the Cause: An Interstate Comparison of
Candidate Withdrawal and Replacement Laws, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413, 436
(2004) (“[B]oth historical and modern experience have demonstrated that courts are at their
lowest level of legitimacy when applying loose principles to contentious issues of election
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Even decisions that do not resolve a disputed election, but instead construe
laws regarding election administration, require legitimacy for the political process
to work. Many people disagreed with the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which held that corporations and unions can
spend an unlimited amount of money from their general treasuries on political
campaigns.53 But the debate focused on whether the Court was incorrect in its legal
and constitutional analysis, not on whether the Court lacked the power to rule the
way it did—that is, on whether the Court’s decision was illegitimate.54
Courts require legitimacy in all of their decisions if they expect people to
follow their mandates.55 The unique position of election law cases, however,
requires heightened legitimacy for the courts. Election law is different because of
the role elections play in our democracy.56 Nothing happens—no laws are passed,
no governing takes place—until someone is elected to an office. Therefore, when
courts become involved in the foundational step of promulgating rules for
elections, their decisions must be seen as a proper exercise of their power. It
follows that any special election law procedure must keep the preservation of the
judiciary’s legitimacy in mind.
D. Minimization of Ideology
Bias in judicial decisions might taint the accuracy and legitimacy of the result.
Because election law cases are fraught with ideological underpinnings, it is
imperative to highlight this reality in any judicial procedure for election law cases.
Simply stated, many election law court battles involve ideological issues, in which
there is a Republican/conservative position and a Democratic/liberal position.57
law. Such cases worry legal observers in the federal system and in states where the
judiciary is relatively independent; in states where judges are elected or otherwise remain
accountable to political leaders, they may be disastrous. Thus, to preserve the appearance
of judicial impartiality, lawmakers should favor rules and objective standards over looser
principles.”).
53
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010); see Robert Barnes, In the
Court of Public Opinion, No Clear Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2010, at A1 (explaining
how President Obama criticized the Supreme Court’s decision during his State of the
Union address).
54
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Kills Campaign Finance Reform,
SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:58PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2242209 (discussing the Roberts
Court’s legal and constitutional analysis in Citizens United v. FEC).
55
See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1450–51 (2001) (discussing the aftermath of the Bush v. Gore
decision and the importance of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy).
56
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (noting that elections are the “very foundations
of our democracy”).
57
For example, “liberal” judges tend to reject a claim of race-based gerrymandering
(thereby allowing legislatures to consider race in redistricting to counter historical racial
discrimination), while “conservative” judges tend to reject any consideration of race in
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Even issues that do not seem partisan on their face—e.g., whether to require voters
to show photo identification to vote—present ideological questions beneath the
surface.58 The judiciary, however, is supposed to be unbiased.59 This tension
requires that any court structure for election law cases minimize the ideological
backgrounds judges will bring to a decision, so as to ensure accuracy, fairness, and
legitimacy.
Instinctively, many people believe that judges will vote with their political
brethren in an election law case.60 Thus, from the outset there is a perceived
ideological bias that a judicial procedure must overcome. Research confirms this
instinct. For example, in a comprehensive study of decisions under the Voting
Rights Act, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas Miles found that the ideology of
the judge rendering a decision (based on the political party of the president
appointing the judge) was a strong predictor of that judge’s vote.61 But judges—
redistricting. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993). Similarly, as a generalization, liberals—whether they are candidates, voters, or
even judges—tend to oppose felon disenfranchisement laws while conservatives tend to
support them. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582,
1594 (2009) (“A party label can tell a voter whether a candidate is liberal or conservative
and thus indicate to a voter how a candidate is likely to approach issues like campaign
finance or felon disenfranchisement.”).
58
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186–87 (2008). Generally,
Republicans favor a photo identification requirement and Democrats oppose such a
requirement. See Democrats Hold Double-Digit Lead in Competitive Districts, PEW RES.
CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Oct. 26, 2006), http://people-press.org/
report/293/democrats-hold-double-digit-lead-in-competitive-districts. This might be
because Republicans generally are more concerned about the integrity of the electoral
process, while Democrats are more concerned about access to the ballot. A cynical
observer would note, however, that those without photo identification tend to be the poor
and minorities, and these voters tend to vote for Democratic candidates. Thus, the stated
policies toward voter identification may be based on partisanship: Republicans want to
place more obstacles to voting for Democratic-leaning voters, and Democrats want to
ensure their supporters have easy access to the ballot.
59
See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 43 (2009) (“The first-best system would be one in which the judiciary is itself
unbiased.”).
60
See Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology versus Character,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 659, 679 (2005) (“Judging aimed at advancing political ideology
naturally conceives of these disputes about the rules of the game as part of the game itself.
An ideological judge will use election law to rig elections for her own faction.”).
61
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 19–25 (2008) (finding that judicial ideology significantly influences judicial
decision making in Voting Rights Act cases); see also Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting
Rights Act through the Justices’ Eyes: NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REV. See also
1, 8 (2009) (finding that conservative Supreme Court justices tend to construe the Voting
Rights Act narrowly while liberal justices interpret the Act more broadly). State courts also
exhibit partisanship in election law cases. See Scott Graves, Competing Interests in State
Supreme Courts: Justices’ Votes and Voting Rights, 24 AM. REV. POL. 267, 276–280
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even partisan elected state judges—are not supposed to be ideological.62 Instead,
the paramount goal of the judiciary is fairness and accuracy.63 Resolving this
tension involves creating a structure that tempers, as best as possible, partisan
decision making. Given that rooting out ideological predilections is nearly
impossible,64 the best procedure for election law cases will minimize ideology by
allowing the viewpoints of many perspectives to infiltrate the process.
E. Proper Judicial Roles
Several of the goals discussed above—as well as current judicial procedures
for election law cases65—give rise to a specific concern about creating a special
procedure for election law. Judges should be asked to perform their traditional
judicial functions, instead of reaching outside of their expertise. The underlying
value is judicial economy,66 so that judges are not learning new skills in the context
of deciding a difficult election law case. This means that judges who typically
focus on fact finding should undertake fact finding in an election law case, while
judges who normally conduct in-depth legal analysis should continue to perform
this role in election law disputes.67 In an area in which we are seeking to achieve

(2003). But see Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the
Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 790–92 (2007)
(positing that the evidence is mixed regarding whether federal judges rule in partisan ways
in election law cases).
62
See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the
Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969 (1999) (“Even if it is not descriptively accurate,
the principle that judges should avoid impinging their personal ideology into constitutional
interpretation remains a normative ideal.”).
63
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 291–92 (“When a court or other tribunal acts to
remedy an election irregularity, the public must . . . have confidence that it will be fixed
fairly and not arbitrarily.”); see also Benson, supra note 43, at 344–45 (explaining that,
along with access, accuracy is one of the key values “at the heart of a healthy democratic
process”).
64
See Eugene Volokh, Pragmatism vs. Ideology in Free Speech Cases, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 33, 34 (2005) (noting, in the First Amendment context, that “one cannot avoid
making ideological judgments”).
65
See infra Part III.
66
See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 863 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “judicial
economy” as “[e]fficiency in the operation of the courts and the judicial system; esp., the
efficient management of litigation so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid
wasting the judiciary’s time and resources”).
67
In a discussion of the proper roles for district and appellate judges in specialized
courts for administrative law questions, Professor Harold Bruff explains that “[t]he
experience of circuit judges may make them better suited than district judges to exercise
administrative review, because appellate judges always serve as restrained reviewers of
decisions by others, not initial triers of fact.” Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 344 (1991). By contrast, district judges are
“possessed of tools for original fact-finding and accustomed to their use.” Id.
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quick adjudication, accuracy in the decision, and legitimacy for the decision
maker, courts should focus on what they do best. A system that places a judge not
only in the middle of a hotly contested election law dispute but also asks that judge
to learn a new or less familiar judicial role is unlikely to achieve these goals
effectively. Thus, when structuring a procedural mechanism for election law, trial
judges should be asked to take on their normal judicial role—discovery
management, evidence gathering, and fact finding, with an initial pass at resolving
questions of law68—while appellate judges should be asked to perform their typical
function—in-depth legal analysis.69
Inherently, this value suggests that a multilayered review process is most
appropriate. However, including appellate judges at the first stage or trial judges at
the second stage mixes these judges’ normal areas of expertise, requiring them to
conduct a form of analysis with which they may be less familiar.70 Moreover, a
single panel of both trial and appellate judges that makes final determinations of
both fact and law will not work because it again asks certain members of the panel
to undertake a function that they do not normally engage in for their other cases.
Given the goals of timeliness, accuracy, and legitimacy, judges should focus their
election law efforts on those tasks they do most often on a regular basis in their
other cases.
In sum, preserving each judge’s normal role will help to achieve the other
principles discussed above. Of course, it is not concerning if a particular
mechanism advances these ideals in a manner that requires certain judges to
perform tasks that they do not normally do; maintaining proper judicial roles is a
secondary consideration that is a means to an end, not an end itself. Exploiting
each type of judge’s normal expertise seems likely to help courts reach fast,
accurate decisions that enjoy widespread legitimacy because judges can focus on
what they are good at in considering the case. Any special procedure for election
law should keep this concept of judicial economy in mind.
F. Signaling
A final, although minor, consideration for an election law judicial procedure
is the signal Congress sends in creating a special system for these cases. Congress
implicitly signals to courts, litigants, and the public that election law cases are
important—indeed, more significant than other cases the courts handle because of
the foundational principles embodied in the decisions.71 In other words, if these

68

See id.
See id. (“The courts of appeals follow procedures designed for resolution of issues
of law.”).
70
See Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights
Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 132 (1996).
71
See Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the Roberts Court: An Introduction,
68 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 735 (2007) (“Both election law and constitutional law are
foundational, then, in the sense of creating frameworks for and setting in motion the
69
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decisions were not somehow different, then why would the legislature create
specific processes for them in the first place? There is something unique about
election law judicial decisions, as they define the rules under which we elect our
leaders and therefore have a tremendous impact on how we are governed.
Moreover, elections are fundamentally important to the foundation of our
democracy.72 If Congress is going to place election law cases in a separate
bucket—and the analysis below demonstrates that it already has73—then it should
actively consider the reasons for doing so and the inherent signal this sends.74
*

*

*

This Part has identified six goals to consider when evaluating current
mechanisms for election law cases. These goals are not meant to be an exhaustive
list, but should provide a starting place for an examination of current court
procedures for election law disputes and the framework for a new uniform judicial
procedure for this area. Of course, there are certainly other values we could
contemplate, including creating specific standards of review or evidentiary rules
for election law cases;75 however, the aforementioned six goals are of vital
importance. Part III builds upon these goals and analyzes current federal court
practices with respect to election law. Part IV proposes a uniform procedure for
election law cases that best achieves these goals.
III. FEDERAL COURT ELECTION LAW PROCEDURE
Federal court election law cases follow one of three trajectories. In the
standard situation, a case originates in the district court, with direct review to a
three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and then discretionary certiorari review
to the Supreme Court.76 In some scenarios, however, the case is first argued to a
three-judge panel of the district court, with direct review to the Supreme Court.77
In still other cases, a single district judge certifies any nonfrivolous constitutional
challenges directly to the en banc court of appeals, with typical certiorari review to
the Supreme Court.78 This Part explores these different mechanisms of hearing
election law cases in federal court. It concludes with a discussion of the
exercise of conventional legislative power by democratically chosen and accountable
officials.”).
72
See Amar, supra note 56, at 13.
73
See infra Part III.
74
Of course, Congress must also keep in mind the concern that creating a special
procedure could actually signal federal court openness to election litigation. Thus, any
procedure should not actively invite election law challenges, and it must include a
mechanism to easily weed out and dismiss frivolous cases. See infra Part IV.
75
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 311.
76
See infra Part III.A.
77
See infra Part III.B.
78
See infra Part III.C.
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DISCLOSE Act, a bill introduced in 2010, which illustrates both Congress’s
interest in court procedure for election law cases and Congress’s partisan approach
to these issues. 79
A. Typical Three-Tiered Federal Court Review
The normal path of a federal court case is quite familiar. First, a district court
initially decides the dispute, making findings of fact and conclusions of law.80 The
losing party then has a right to direct review before a three-judge panel of the court
of appeals for that circuit.81 A losing party at the court of appeals has two
recourses: seek en banc review, in which every judge from that circuit hears the
case,82 or seek review from the Supreme Court through the certiorari process.83
Importantly, review at the Supreme Court is discretionary and requires the vote of
four justices.84
Between 2000 and 2009, the Supreme Court heard fifteen election law cases
that came through the typical process: district court, court of appeals, then
certiorari.85 These cases generally involved constitutional challenges to a state’s
79

See infra Part III.D.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 132(c), 1331, 1332 (2006).
81
See id. §§ 46, 1291, 1294.
82
Id. § 46(c). Because of its size (twenty-nine active judges), the Ninth Circuit allows
for only a “limited en banc” review, in which the en banc court consists of the chief judge
and ten additional active judges selected at random. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
83
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Note that the court of appeals can also certify a question of
law to the Supreme Court. Id. § 1254(2). The Supreme Court, however, has not accepted a
certified question from the courts of appeals since 1981. United States v. Seale, 130 S. Ct.
12, 13 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting from the dismissal of the certified question).
84
See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
296–300 (8th ed. 2002) (describing the “Rule of Four”).
85
Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5 (2008) (considering a challenge to
state’s compliance with HAVA); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181
(2008) (considering the constitutionality of Indiana’s voter identification law); Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (examining the
constitutionality of Washington’s “top two” primary system); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections
v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (considering New York state’s judicial appointment
system); Purcell v. Gonzelez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (vacating an order of the Ninth Circuit
enjoining operation of Arizona’s voter identification laws); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230 (2006) (reviewing the constitutionality of the Vermont Campaign Finance Reform
Act); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (considering the constitutionality of
Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003)
(analyzing the constitutionality of a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (considering the constitutionality
of the Minnesota judicial canon prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing views on
legal or political issues); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431
(2001) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act
coordinated expenditure limits); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) (considering a
constitutional challenge to an initiative amending the Missouri Constitution to require any
80
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election law practice.86 Importantly, the Court chose to hear these cases, thus
determining that the issues were ready for Supreme Court resolution.
In this three-tiered process, decision making occurs in the following way: the
district court issues findings of fact and also takes a first pass at the
constitutionality of the provision.87 District judges have significant power over the
scope of the litigation through their evidentiary rulings and factual findings. If
appealed, a three-judge panel of the court of appeals reviews the district court’s
decision, giving great deference to the district court’s factual findings, but making
its own assessment on the constitutional question.88 Thus, there are at least three
appellate judges who take a fresh look at legal issues, with additional judges
analyzing the dispute if it goes en banc. If the Supreme Court accepts the case for
review, it too generally defers to the district court for factual disputes (unless the
lower court’s findings are clearly erroneous) but provides its own view on the legal
constitutional issue.89
For example, consider the recent challenge in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board to Indiana’s voter identification law, a particularly hot-button
election issue.90 The district judge issued a seventy-page decision, laying out in
detail the factual underpinnings of the case and analyzing the legal questions
regarding the plaintiffs’ standing and the constitutionality of the voter
identification statute.91 A large part of the court’s decision involved describing the
purportedly undisputed facts of the case, detailing the evidence the plaintiffs
presented regarding the way in which the statute allegedly impacted various
voters.92 The court considered the reliability of an expert report and reviewed the
evidence of the statute’s alleged infringement on voters’ rights.93
On direct review, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district judge’s conclusion that the law was constitutional,
spending the bulk of its decision on the legal questions of standing and alleged
candidate for Congress that did not support term limits to have that listed on ballot); Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (analyzing a constitutional challenge to
California’s blanket primary system); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (reviewing
the constitutionality of Hawaii’s voter eligibility requirement for trustees for Office of
Hawaiian Affairs); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (considering a
challenge to provisions of Missouri’s campaign finance law); Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S.
250 (2000) (determining whether the Organic Act of Guam required a runoff election for
the governor and lieutenant governor of Guam).
86
See cases cited supra note 85. Two of the cases were constitutional challenges to
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 149; Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 437.
87
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).
88
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
89
See, e.g., Clingman, 544 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that a district
court’s factual findings are “entitled to substantial deference”).
90
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008).
91
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
92
Id. at 785–97.
93
Id. at 783, 803–09.
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infringement on voters’ rights.94 There was little discussion of the district court’s
factual findings per se; those facts merely informed the court’s legal conclusions.95
The plaintiffs sought en banc review, but the majority of judges on the Seventh
Circuit declined to rehear the case, with four judges dissenting.96
The plaintiffs then filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the
Court agreed to hear the case.97 At the merits stage, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Seventh Circuit and upheld the voter identification law, focusing its decision
on the legal intricacies of a law requiring photo identification.98 Notably, the Court
dismissed the standing issue briefly in its opinion, instead winnowing the case to
the key legal issue of the alleged constitutional burden Indiana’s voter
identification law imposed.99 The Court’s majority relied heavily on the district
court’s factual findings, refusing to question the court’s view that the plaintiffs had
failed to provide sufficient evidence of voter infringement under the photo
identification law.100 The Court stressed that it was focusing on the evidence in the
record, leaving the factual findings to the district court and simply using those
findings to make its legal conclusions.101
The three-tiered process in Crawford displays several attributes emblematic of
the standard federal court approach to election law (and most other) cases. First, a
single district judge is given great latitude to render factual findings. That judge is
closest to the facts and is best equipped to make evidentiary findings “on the
ground” of the litigation.102 The district judge also takes a first pass at the legal
issues. Second, a randomly selected three-judge panel focuses on the legal
questions, informed by the district court’s factual findings. En banc review is
94

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). One
judge dissented. See id. at 954 (Evans, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
95
Id. at 950–52.
96
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
97
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 551 U.S. 1192, 1192 (2007).
98
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–204 (2008).
99
See id. at 189 n.7 (“We also agree with the unanimous view of those judges that the
Democrats have standing to challenge the validity of SEA 483 and that there is no need to
decide whether the other petitioners also have standing.”).
100
Id. at 187, 201.
101
See, e.g., id. at 202 (“In sum, on the basis of the record that has been made in this
litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes ‘excessively burdensome
requirements’ on any class of voters.”).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Aguwa, 123 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that
“appellate courts are not equipped to resolve factual issues”); see also Frank O. Bowman,
III, Coping With “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes
under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 536 (1998) (“District courts are very well
equipped to make findings of fact. That is, after all, their job.”); Jeremy M. Taylor,
Comment, The Ghost of Harlan: The Unfulfilled Search for Judicially Manageable
Standards in Voting Rights Litigation, 65 MISS. L.J. 431, 454–55 (1995) (explaining that
the Fifth Circuit routinely remanded voting rights cases to the district court for specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law).
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discretionary, so the three-judge panel has a great deal of power in rendering a
final decision on the disputed legal issues, which a subsequent panel must
follow.103 The appellate panel’s decision is often definitive; the Supreme Court
agrees to hear only a small percentage of cases on discretionary certiorari
review.104 If the Court chooses to decide the case, it too will give great deference to
the district judge’s factual findings and will focus on the legal or constitutional
issues. Additionally, the certiorari process allows the parties and the Court to
narrow the scope of the legal issues under review, as the Court decides only those
questions it wishes to hear.
As with any system, there are both advantages and disadvantages to
proceeding in this manner. Because it is the standard appellate process for most
cases in all areas of law,105 perhaps its most obvious virtue is that the three-tiered
process best preserves each judge’s proper role, engaging each judge’s
expertise.106 It ensures that multiple judges are not bogged down with the minutiae
of evidentiary disputes, instead leaving factual findings to a single judge who is, in
theory, experienced with sorting out the facts of a case. Additionally, federal courts
are used to this process, and they know how to operate within this system. The
typical review pattern works well for the vast majority of cases; it requires litigants
to present their best evidence at the start, yet provides several chances to make
legal arguments using that evidence. Given that election law cases involve highlycharged issues that require careful adjudication, the three-tiered approach provides
a systematic mechanism to ensure that each judge best uses his or her particular
skills in this environment.
There is also an institutionalized correction mechanism, helping to foster
accuracy.107 The legal issues are well thought-out and briefed through multiple
tiers of review; many judges have a chance to pass upon the questions; and the
review process narrows down the important or difficult ones so that the higher
level courts can focus in on the tough issues. Thus, the multilayered review process
103

See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604–
06, 1627–28 (2000) (noting that three-judge panels decide the vast majority of appeals and
highlighting the criticism that these panels wield too much power); Jonathan Remy Nash,
The Majority that Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and the Mischief of Quorum
Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831, 857–58 (2009) (“The power of the three-judge panel in
some ways exceeds what one normally understands as stare decisis weight: No subsequent
three-judge panel of the court is empowered to overrule an earlier holding of a three-judge
panel.”).
104
See, e.g., John R. Quinn, “Attitudinal” Decision Making in the Federal Courts: A
Study of Constitutional Self-Representation Claims, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701, 712 (1996)
(“The extremely small percentage of certiorari petitions the Supreme Court grants, among
other things, makes a circuit court decision much less likely to be reviewed than a district
court decision, many of which are appealable as of right.”).
105
See Bruff, supra note 67, at 344.
106
See supra Part II.E.
107
See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 55–69 (2010)
(describing an appellate court’s institutional error-correction function).
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perhaps can best lead to the “correct” legal result.108 Indeed, by having the
opportunity to test out arguments at the district court, litigants can see what
arguments work as they prepare for the (possible) multiple levels of review.
Having subsequently higher courts consider an issue also ensures a great amount of
deliberation, and the courts are likely to consider carefully the application of a rule
to future scenarios and how the rule should shape the democratic process.109 Thus,
in an area in which certainty and accuracy in legal principles are paramount, a
multiple-level system seems well suited to achieve these goals.
Of course, many cases will not benefit from three tiers of review, tempering
the likelihood of full error correction in every instance. Although legal issues are
well vetted through multiple layers of review, most cases—which will not reach
either the en banc circuit court or the Supreme Court given that those bodies
decline to review most cases—benefit from the analysis of only four judges (one
district judge and three circuit court judges). If more judges equal “better” decision
making,110 then this system does not easily foster a multiplicity of viewpoints.
Only the most contentious or “important” cases (according to the en banc court or
Supreme Court) receive scrutiny from the greatest number of possible judges.111
Then again, the traditional federal court system at least has a mechanism for
multiple layers of review for those cases that are hardest or most significant.
There are, of course, several downsides to the standard federal court judicial
process. For one, multilayered federal court review is arduous and lengthy, often
taking several years before a final resolution. With multiple judicial layers, parties
must sometimes wait years before learning the ultimate result. For example, the
plaintiffs in Crawford filed their complaint on May 2, 2005,112 the district court
rendered its decision on April 14, 2006,113 and the Supreme Court did not issue its
decision until April 28, 2008.114 This is especially troubling in election law cases,
in which timely finality is important. Governments must attempt to operate their
elections as fairly as possible within the confines of the rules that courts dictate,
and elected leaders must have prompt legitimacy for effective governing. Thus,
regarding timeliness, the traditional system leaves much to be desired for election

108

However, this procedure does not give the courts a similar ability for robust error
correction of factual findings, as the appellate courts usually defer to the district court’s
findings of fact. See, e.g., Walls v. Konteh, 490 F.3d 432, 440 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[R]eviewing courts typically defer to the judgment of the initial arbiter on largely factbased matters”).
109
See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 847 (1994).
110
See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1695 (1998).
111
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006) (en banc review); id. § 1254 (certiorari review).
112
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita,
458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (No. 1:05-cv-0634-SEB-VSS), 2005 WL 3708052.
113
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
114
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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law cases, particularly when the parties need to know how to conduct themselves
for upcoming elections.
In addition, given the method through which judges are selected to hear a
case, it can appear that the ultimate outcome is largely dependent on the ideology
of the judges—particularly with respect to the appellate judges. In a random
drawing of a three-judge panel for direct review of a district court’s decision, the
panel might differ significantly in its political and ideological viewpoint as
compared to another randomly selected three-judge panel.115 This is significant
with respect to the way in which judges construe a constitutional rule or analyze a
statute: broadly, narrowly, textually, etc. Assuming ideology influences decisions,
the ideology of the panel can have an extremely poignant impact on the ultimate
resolution and thus the scope of the rule of law handed down.116 Elections are
about the allocation of power; judicial partisanship should not play a role in the
process, especially given that the federal judiciary is supposed to be a neutral
arbiter. Ideological decision making calls into question the fairness of the electoral
process.
The concern of ideological decisions is also present with respect to district
judges, who are normally randomly assigned a case when it is filed,117 but the
importance of ideology at the district court stage is tempered for two main reasons.
First, district judges know that the court of appeals almost certainly will review
their decisions, and there is some evidence that district courts keep a keen eye on
the circuit’s opinions and try to align their decisions so as to avoid reversal.118
Second, although district judges might make certain factual findings with an

115

See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 226 (1999) (using empirical analysis to show
that “one-party dominance on panels occurs at a surprisingly high rate”); J. Robert Brown,
Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 1037, 1041–43 (2000) (explaining that even though “[a]ppellate panels are not
intended to reflect a mosaic of society,” it is a concern that “systems of assignment are
susceptible to at least some degree of manipulation”).
116
Tiller & Cross, supra note 115, at 226.
117
See Ahmed E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political
Orientations Affect Case Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2010) (“Judicial
assignment is conducted randomly in federal district courts.”).
118
See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 34, 40, 48–50 (1996) (finding relatively little difference
between district judges appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents over all cases,
but larger differences in cases involving controversial issues such as race relations,
religion, and privacy); Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., International Conflicts and Decision
Making on the Federal District Courts, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 134 (2008) (finding that
district judges are “marginally constrained” by the perceived preferences of the circuit
court in which they sit and that district judges consider the likelihood of reversal in their
decisions). Of course, predicting what the circuit court will do is not an exact science given
that the case will go to a randomly-assigned three-judge panel.
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ideological bent, evidentiary rulings typically have little political tenor.119 Given
that the appellate court ultimately will decide questions of law, and will do so de
novo,120 the district court’s ideology comes through only in the way that its factual
findings influence the appellate court’s decision. Thus, although district judges’
ideology may matter to the ultimate outcome of the issue, it likely matters less than
appellate judges’ ideological predilections. If anything, district judges’ greatest
ideological influence is indirect through their factual findings, to which the
appellate courts will usually defer.
The problem of ideology, however, is prevalent with respect to another one of
the goals previously discussed: legitimacy for the court’s decisions.121 Consistently
ideological decisions will derogate courts’ standing in the public’s eye,122
particularly for election law cases, which often present either obvious or latent
partisan issues.123 This is particularly true if successive courts reverse each other.
Imagine a case in which the district court rules in favor of the “Republican”
position, only to suffer reversal from a three-judge court of appeals that sides with
the “Democratic” argument, to then have the Supreme Court reverse that decision
and ultimately rule in favor of the “Republican” position.124 The public will likely
119

Richard L. Sippel, Analysis of Evidence by Terence Anderson and William
Twining, FED. LAW., Aug. 1999, at 52, 56 n.7 (Aug. 1999) (book review) (“In general, trial
judges are much more interested in getting it right the first time and avoiding reversal or a
remand on appeal than they are in moving a legislative-type agenda through evidentiary
rulings.”). But see J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting
Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 866 (1989) (“[T]he decision to admit or exclude
evidence necessarily entails making a political choice to favor some values over others.”).
120
See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 233 (6th Cir.
2011) (explaining, in an election law case, that “we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error”).
121
See supra Part II.C.
122
See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643,
650 (2008) (“Sometimes labeled ‘diffuse support,’ [the] willingness to accept judicial
judgments with which one disagrees and to defend the institution of judicial review seems
connected to citizens’ perception of the Court as a distinctly legal, as opposed to political,
institution.”); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 993 (2005)
(“Putting judges in the position of deciding election law questions when the winner and
loser of its decision will be obvious can undermine the legitimacy of the courts. Moreover,
when judges second-guess decisions made by legislators and votes cast by the people, the
legitimacy of the election process itself can suffer.” (citation omitted)).
123
Of course, not every election law case will involve a partisan issue. Moreover, it
may not be obvious which position each political persuasion will favor. See Solimine,
supra note 70, at 123–25. Nevertheless, there are many cases in which the ideological
issues are obvious or at least beneath the surface.
124
The case of Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005), presents this exact scenario,
although not in the context of a pure Democratic/Republican split. In Clingman, the district
court rejected a third party’s constitutional challenge to Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary
election system, in which a political party could invite only its own party members and
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think that the judiciary is just as political as the other branches, especially if the
courts’ decisions adhere to each judge’s ideological leanings.125
Finally, the three-tiered system presents a mixed bag when it comes to
signaling. On the one hand, this process does a great job of telling the litigants and
the public which cases are highly salient or important because only those cases
receive greater scrutiny through en banc or Supreme Court review. On the other
hand, the judiciary treats all election law cases just like any other case without
distinguishing them from other run-of-the-mill disputes. From a normative and
institutional perspective, there is no signal that all election law cases present
especially important issues, even when a particular case does or does not deserve
the scrutiny of higher courts. For example, a case could have significant
implications for how to run elections or campaigns, but for whatever reason, the
Supreme Court chooses not to take it (perhaps because the Court is waiting to see
if there will be a circuit split on the issue).126 The message to the public at large is
voters registered as Independents to vote in the party’s primary. Beaver v. Clingman, No.
CIV-00-1071, 2003 WL 745562, at *23 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2003). The Tenth Circuit
reversed, concluding that the statute violated the associational rights of minor political
parties. Beaver v. Clingman, 363 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court
reversed, over the dissent of three of the more “liberal” justices (Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg), and upheld the statute. 544 U.S. at 598; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 383–84, 397–98 (2000) (explaining that the district court upheld a
provision of Missouri’s campaign finance law; the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court; the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the provision).
125
See Elmendorf, supra note 122, at 650 (“[I]t seems fair to expect that the mass
public’s perception of courts as above politics will gradually erode if highly partisan
election-law issues become a recurring part of the judicial docket and judges consistently
take ‘their’ respective party’s side in answering the question presented.”).
126
For example, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a seemingly important
challenge to North Carolina’s campaign finance regulations that provide public funding for
appellate judicial elections, including a complete ban on campaign contributions during the
last twenty-one days of the election. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political
Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 432, 440 (4th Cir. 2008), cert denied sub nom. Duke
v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008). Commentators who study both the Supreme Court and
election law had predicted that the Court would take the case, as it presented significant
issues regarding public financing of judicial elections. See, e.g., Troy D. Cahill, Conference
Call: Judge Election Case Heads to High Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct, 27, 2008,
5:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/10/conference-call-judge-election-case-headsto-high-court/#more-8153; Rick Hasen, Fourth Circuit Decides Two Important Campaign
Finance Cases, Raising Issues that Could Get En Banc or Supreme Court Attention,
ELECTION LAW BLOG (May 1, 2008, 12:32 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/
010719.html. Although the certiorari petition itself generated some minor commentary, this
pales in comparison to the information the public would have received about the case had
the Court decided to hear it. Thus, the simple district judge and three-judge panel decision
did not signal the importance of this issue to anyone besides those who already study this
field. It certainly did not send the message that these types of questions are vitally
important to understanding the role of money in politics. Although, arguably, the Court’s
decisions in other similar cases already give the public this knowledge, the issue is not
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that the case is just as insignificant as any other case the Court declines to hear.
The typical procedure thus does a poor job of highlighting that election law cases
are different and meaningful based on the foundational nature of the right to vote
to the running of our democracy.
In sum, the standard federal court procedure, typically used for constitutional
challenges to state election laws, presents a mixed bag. On the plus side, this
approach is good at separating each judge’s role. District judges generally focus on
factual findings, and appellate judges spend most of their time analyzing the legal
constitutional questions, which is what these judges do for most of their other
cases as well. The multiple levels of review also promote accuracy through error
correction, although the fact that most cases do not enjoy three levels of review
tempers this virtue. On the negative side, the three-tiered approach is slow, and it
does not include any structural mechanisms to minimize ideology—a concern by
itself and also a problem through the negative impact this has on the legitimacy of
the court system in deciding election law cases. It also does not signal, for election
law as a whole, that this area is any more important, significant, or at least in need
of special attention than any other area.
B. Three-Judge District Court with Direct Review to the Supreme Court
The second method of federal court procedure for election law cases involves
a three-judge district court, with direct review to the Supreme Court. Congress has
authorized three-judge district courts in three situations: challenges under the
Voting Rights Act (VRA),127 constitutional challenges under the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),128 and constitutional challenges to the
apportionment of statewide or federal legislative districts.129
In these cases, the chief of the circuit court appoints the three-judge panel,
which must include at least one circuit court judge.130 The court sits as a district
court, conducting a trial on the merits of the case.131 Although a single judge from
the panel can make pretrial evidentiary rulings, the full panel must render any

whether a single case tells the public about an issue, but instead, whether the judiciary is set
up institutionally to elevate the public’s understanding of the issues that form the basis of
our democracy.
127
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 1973aa-2 (2006).
128
Act of Mar. 27, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 82, 114 (“The action
shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and shall be
heard by a 3-judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 28, United States
Code.”); 2 U.S.C. § 437h note (2006).
129
28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2006) (“A district court of three judges shall be convened
when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of
any statewide legislative body.”).
130
Id. § 2284(b)(1).
131
Id. § 2284(b)(3).
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factual findings.132 Similarly, the panel must resolve any questions of law.133 The
parties appeal directly to the Supreme Court, and the Court does not have
discretion to decline the appeal.134 The Court can “note probable jurisdiction,”135
which means that it will conduct a full merits hearing on the case, or it can
summarily affirm or summarily reverse, but either way the Supreme Court must
decide the dispute.136
As noted above, Congress has seen fit to implement three-judge district courts
in three main settings. First, a three-judge court must hear a challenge that a state’s
action violates the VRA.137 Thus, if a plaintiff seeks invalidation of a state’s law
because the state seeks to use a test or device as a prerequisite to voting, or if a
litigant alleges that a covered jurisdiction failed to obtain preapproval (called
“preclearance”) for a change in a voting practice, that dispute must go to a threejudge district court, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court.138 Second, the BCRA
provides that if any action is brought to challenge the constitutionality of any
provision of the Act, it “shall be filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and shall be heard by a 3-judge court” pursuant to title 28,
section 2284 of the United States Code.139 That is, constitutional challenges to the
BCRA require a three-judge district court with direct Supreme Court review.
Finally, title 28, section 2284 of the United States Code is the general statute
authorizing three-judge district courts when “otherwise required by Act of
Congress,” and additionally “when an action is filed challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”140
Prior to the enactment of title 28, section 2284 of the United States Code,
Congress created three-judge district courts in certain situations initially as a
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Young.141 In that case, the
Supreme Court recognized federal courts’ power to enjoin the action of state
officials when those actions violated the U.S. Constitution.142 States’ rights
132

Id.
Id.
134
Id. § 1253.
135
See SUP. CT. R. 18(12).
136
See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 343, 346
n.26 (2004) (“When Congress has provided by statute for direct Supreme Court review of a
district court decision, the Court may summarily affirm, summarily reverse, or . . . note
probable jurisdiction and review the case with the benefit of briefing and oral argument.”).
137
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-2, 1973c (2006).
138
Id.; see, e.g., Lulac of Tex. v. Texas, 318 F. App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“Section 5 preclearance actions generally must be resolved by a three-judge court, whose
decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court.”).
139
Act of Mar. 27, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(1), 116 Stat. 82, 114 (2002).
140
28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2006). For an overview of the subject-matter of cases heard
before three-judge district courts from 1964 to 1994, see Solimine, supra note 70, at 91–92.
141
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally Solimine, supra note 70, at
83–93 (discussing the history of three-judge district courts).
142
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
133
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advocates were distraught at what they saw as the Supreme Court’s usurpation of
state power.143 In response, Congress enacted the first iteration of the three-judge
district court statute, which required suits seeking relief against state officials to go
initially before a three-judge panel, with direct review to the Supreme Court.144 As
one commentator explains, this “format was designed to encourage greater
deliberation among three minds before a grant of injunctive relief, to lend greater
dignity to the proceedings, and to provide expedited Supreme Court correction, if
necessary.”145
In subsequent years, Congress expanded, and then contracted, the use of
three-judge district courts.146 Ultimately, Congress enacted what is now title 28,
section 2284 of the United States Code, which authorizes three-judge district
courts for reapportionment cases and in other situations Congress may deem
necessary.147 In that legislation, Congress curtailed the broad use of three-judge
district courts for any suit seeking injunctive relief against a state official, but still
explicitly included reapportionment cases within the three-judge district court
ambit because, in the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, those cases were of “great
public concern” that required tremendous “public acceptance” to ensure their
legitimacy.148 The legislative history explains, albeit briefly, Congress’s rationale
for retaining three-judge district courts for reapportionment cases:
The bill preserves three-judge courts for cases involving congressional
reapportionment or the reapportionment of a statewide legislative body
because it is the judgment of the committee that these issues are of such
importance that they ought to be heard by a three-judge court and, in any
event, they have never constituted a large number of cases.149
[The bill] . . . is supported by the Judicial Conference, the Department of
Justice, and the American Bar Association. Although the NAACP has
spoken in opposition to restriction of three-judge court jurisdiction, the
Committee is satisfied that the civil rights of citizens will continue to be
well protected by this bill.150

143

See David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–8 (1964); Solimine, supra note 70, at 83–84.
144
See Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557.
145
Solimine, supra note 70, at 84.
146
Id. at 83–89.
147
See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 3, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119.
148
See Sidney B. Jacoby, Recent Proposals and Legislative Efforts to Limit ThreeJudge Court Jurisdiction, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 32, 39 (1975).
149
S. REP. NO. 94-204, at 4, 9 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1991.
150
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1379, at 4 (1976).
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From 2000–2009, half of the Supreme Court’s thirty election law cases
derived from decisions of three-judge district courts.151 Five of these cases arose
out of VRA challenges, four arose under the BCRA, and the remaining six were
reapportionment or redistricting cases.152 Thus, all three sources of three-judge
panels for election law cases regularly fill the Court’s election law docket.153
As would be expected, there are both virtues and pitfalls to using three-judge
district courts with direct review to the Supreme Court for election law cases,
particularly in light of the goals set out in Part II. The first major benefit is the
timeliness with which this system can produce a final result. Indeed, quick
adjudication was one of the main purposes behind the creation of three-judge
district courts.154 Take, for example, the recent major VRA case, Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder.155 The three-judge district court
151

Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (reviewing
challenge to the preclearance requirement and bail out provisions of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA)); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (reviewing challenge to the
“Millionaires’ Amendment” of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA));
Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008) (reviewing whether a state must obtain
preclearance under the VRA to reinstate an election practice that had been in effect before
the enactment of a law that the state supreme court subsequently struck down); FEC v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (reviewing challenge to “electioneering
communications” provisions of the BCRA); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (per
curiam) (reviewing whether plaintiffs had standing to assert a violation of the Elections
Clause of the U.S. Constitution); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),
548 U.S. 399 (2006) (reviewing challenges to a mid-decade redistricting plan as violating
equal protection and the VRA); Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006)
(reviewing constitutional challenge to the BCRA as applied to broadcast advertisements the
plaintiffs planned to air during an upcoming election); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004)
(reviewing constitutionality of a Georgia legislative reapportionment plan for the State
House of Representatives and Senate); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (reviewing
claims of partisan gerrymandering in a redistricting plan for U.S. House seats in
Pennsylvania); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (reviewing consolidated challenges
to the constitutionality of the BCRA); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (reviewing
a three-judge panel’s refusal to grant preclearance to Georgia’s state legislature’s
redistricting plan under the VRA); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) (reviewing
challenge to a district court’s redistricting plan in Mississippi); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S.
452 (2002) (reviewing constitutional challenge to the use of the “hot deck imputation”
method of supplementing census data); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)
(reviewing constitutionality of a North Carolina redistricting plan); Reno v. Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (reviewing a decision to grant preclearance to Louisiana
parish school board redistricting). In addition, during 2010, the Court decided one case
arising from a three-judge district court. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(reviewing challenge to provisions of the BCRA).
152
See cases cited supra note 151.
153
For a compilation of the number of orally argued three-judge court cases on the
Supreme Court’s docket from 1953 to 1993, see Solimine, supra note 70, at 107.
154
See supra note 141–145 and accompanying text.
155
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
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rendered its final decision in that case on September 4, 2008.156 The Supreme
Court received jurisdictional statements and noted probable jurisdiction only a few
months later, on January 9, 2009.157 The Court issued its final decision in the case
on June 22, 2009.158 Thus, appellate resolution took less than a year.
This is consistent with the other three-judge district court cases in which the
Supreme Court heard oral argument between 2000–2009. As table 1 demonstrates,
the Supreme Court disposes of most cases within about a year or less of the district
court’s final decision. This is in contrast to the time it usually takes the district
court to render a decision once a plaintiff files a complaint,159 because—unless the
court dismisses the case at the pleadings stage—a district court must expend
significant time and energy gathering evidence and making findings of fact.160
Skipping the regular court of appeals stage quickens the pace at which the parties
can obtain final resolution in the Supreme Court, as it shortens the period between
the district court’s final decision and the Supreme Court’s review.

156

Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C.

2008).
157

Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009) (Mem.).
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
159
Although there are outliers, the district courts in these cases most often needed
between nine months and three years to render a decision. See infra Table 1. Of course,
during much of this time the parties were likely engaged in discovery.
160
It is possible that a three-judge district court takes longer to cull through the
evidence and render a decision than would be the case for a single district judge, somewhat
mitigating the increased speed of direct Supreme Court review. See infra text
accompanying notes 227–228. Nevertheless, election law cases are likely to be inherently
complex, meaning that it would take a district court a considerable amount of time to
render a decision regardless of whether it does so through a single judge or a three-judge
panel.
158
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Table 1: Time to Decide Cases Before Three-Judge District Court Panels with
Direct Review to the Supreme Court, 2000–2009
Case

Date Case
Filed

Date of
District
Court
Decision

Nw. Austin
Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One
v. Holder
Davis v. FEC

Aug. 4,
2006161

Sept. 4,
2008162

June 28,
2006164

Aug. 9,
2007165

Riley v.
Kennedy

Nov. 16,
2005167

May 1,
2007168

FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life,
Inc.
Lance v.
Coffman

July 28,
2004170

Dec. 21,
2006171

Dec. 3,
2003173

Aug. 11,
2006174

161

Time
Between
Date Case
Filed and
District
Court’s
Decision
2 years,
1 month

Date of
Supreme
Court
Decision

Time Between
District Court
and Supreme
Court
Decisions

June 22,
2009163

9 months,
18 days

1 year,
1 month,
12 days
1 year,
5 months,
15 days
2 years,
4 months,
23 days
2 years,
8 months,
8 days

June 26,
2008166

10 months,
17 days

May 27,
2008169

1 year,
26 days

June 25,
2007172

6 months,
4 days

Mar. 5,
2007175

6 months,
22 days

Complaint, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221
(D.D.C. 2008) (Civ. No. 06-01384).
162
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C.
2008).
163
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
164
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Davis v FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22
(D.D.C. 2007) (Civ. No. 06-01185).
165
Davis v FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2007).
166
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
167
Complaint, Kennedy v. Riley, Civ. No. 2:05cv1100-MHT (M.D. Ala. May 1,
2007), 2007 WL 1284912.
168
Kennedy v. Riley, Civ. No. 2:05cv1100-MHT (M.D. Ala. May 1, 2007), 2007 WL
1284912.
169
Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008).
170
Docket, Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (Civ.
No. 04-1260).
171
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006).
172
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
173
Docket, Lance v. Coffman, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Colo. 2006) (Civ. No. 0302453).
174
Lance v. Coffman, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Colo. 2006).
175
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007).
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Wis. Right to
Life v. FEC
LULAC v.
Perry

July 26,
2004176
Oct. 12,
2003179

May 10,
2005177
June 9,
2005180

Cox v. Larios
Vieth v.
Jubelirer

Mar. 13,
2003182
Dec. 21,
2001185

Feb. 10,
2004183
Jan. 24,
2003186

McConnell v.
FEC

Mar. 27,
2002188

May 1,
2003189

Georgia v.
Ashcroft

Oct. 10,
2001191

Branch v.
Smith

Nov. 1,
2001194

176

461

Jan. 23,
2006178
June 28,
2006181

8 months,
13 days
1 year,
19 days

June 30,
2004184
Apr. 28,
2004187

4 months,
20 days
1 year,
3 months,
4 days
7 months,
9 days

Apr.5,
2002192

9 months,
14 days
1 year,
7 months,
28 days
10 months,
28 days
1 year,
1 month,
3 days
1 year,
1 month,
4 days
5 months,
26 days

Feb. 26,
2002195

3 months,
25 days

Mar. 31,
2003196

Dec. 10,
2003190
June 26,
2003193

1 year,
2 months,
21 days
1 year,
1 month,
5 days

Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wis. Right to Life, Inc.
v. FEC, No. Civ.04-1260DBS (D.D.C. May 10, 2005), 2005 WL 3470512.
177
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. Civ.04-1260DBS (D.D.C. May 10, 2005),
2005 WL 3470512.
178
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
179
Docket, Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (Civ. No. 030354).
180
Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
181
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
182
Docket, Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (No. CIV.A. 1:03–
CV–693–CAP).
183
Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
184
Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
185
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F.
Supp. 2d 478 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (Civ. No. 01-2439).
186
Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
187
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
188
Docket, McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D.D.C. 2003) (Civ. No. 020581).
189
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D.D.C 2003).
190
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
191
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25
(D.D.C. 2002) (Civ. No. 01-2111).
192
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002).
193
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
194
Docket, Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (Civ. No. 010855).
195
Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
196
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003).
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Utah v. Evans
Easley v.
Cromartie
Reno v.
Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd.

Apr. 25,
2001197
July 3,
1996200

Nov. 1,
2001198
Mar. 7,
2000201

July 8,
1994203

May 1,
1998204

6 months,
7 days
3 years,
8 months,
4 days
3 years,
9 months,
23 days

[NO. 2
June 20,
2002199
Apr. 18,
2001202
Jan. 24,
2000205

7 months,
19 days
1 year,
1 month,
11 days
1 year,
8 months,
23 days

This is quite different from the typical three-tiered approach, which often
requires several years before the Supreme Court reaches a final resolution.206
Hence, cutting out one level of appeal seems to assist in the timely resolution of
important election law disputes.207
Additionally, having three judges take an initial look at the case increases the
possibility that the district court will make an accurate decision and potentially
reduces the importance of ideology. The conventional wisdom behind appellate
courts is that judges collectively can make better decisions, increasing the potential
for the “correct” answer from the outset.208 Further, using multiple judges
decreases the possibility that ideology will drive the decision because multiple
judges temper the ideological bent a single judge may bring to a case, assuming the
197

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d
1165 (D. Utah 2001) (Civ. No. 01-0292).
198
Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Utah 2001).
199
Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
200
Complaint, Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (No. 4.96CV-104).
201
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
202
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
203
Complaint, Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1994) (No.
1:94cv01495).
204
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998).
205
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
206
See supra text accompanying notes 87–104, 112–114. In Crawford, the Supreme
Court issued its decision two years and fourteen days after the district court’s decision. See
supra text accompanying notes 112–114. Of course, cases that do not use all levels of
review are resolved sooner.
207
But see Solimine, supra note 70, at 126 (suggesting that a single-judge model with
expedited review could achieve the same virtues as a three-judge court).
208
See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 42 (1994) (postulating that
“numerical superiority of higher level courts by itself ensures better decisionmaking”).
Professor Caminker explains that if every judge has merely a 50% chance at reaching the
“correct” answer, then the larger the panel, the more likely the panel collectively will reach
the right result. Id. at 42 n.155.; see also Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study
of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 899, 924 (1989) (“Assigning several judges to a problem reduces the risk that
important lines of analysis will escape attention.”).
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panel includes judges of varied viewpoints.209 Indeed, the whole purpose behind
the creation of the three-judge court was to “encourage greater deliberation among
three minds.”210
A multiple-judge panel also enhances the legitimacy of the court’s decision in
an area in which perceived accuracy is paramount.211 There is a symbolic virtue in
having three judges initially decide an election law case; the litigants and the
public likely perceive the decision to be more reasoned and accurate because
multiple judges have considered the issue.212 It further signals to the litigants and
the public that the issue is, indeed, important enough for three judges at the start.
With these benefits, however, come negative aspects to three-judge panels
with direct Supreme Court review. First, this set-up does not allow the appellate
process to winnow legal questions for the Supreme Court’s consideration, and thus
there is no narrowing of the legal issues as the case moves up the chain.213 Instead,
the Court must consider all cases originating from a three-judge court, even if it
does so in a summary fashion.214 The Court must actually consider the merits of
each case as opposed to just allowing the lower court decision to stand without any
binding decision from the Supreme Court, as is the scenario when the Court denies
certiorari.215 Professor Michael Solimine describes the pitfalls of this approach as
follows:

209

See Joy Milligan, Note, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves
Legal Decisions about Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1234 (2006)
(discussing research demonstrating that “judges within panels may learn from one
another’s ideas and worldviews”).
210
Solimine, supra note 70, at 84.
211
See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747,
757 (1982) (“Assuming that all panel members take seriously their responsibility for
independent exercise of judgment, the give and take of discussion may produce a result
better than any single mind could reach.”); see also Caminker, supra note 208, at 40
(“Federal courts depend on the perceived legitimacy of their enterprise for their authority to
ensure others follow their decision.”).
212
See Solimine, supra note 70, at 127 (“To the extent that anyone, inside or outside
the legal community, really pays attention, there is perhaps some added value to having
three judges, including at least one appellate jurist, hear the case at the outset.”).
213
See Douglas Y.S. Park & Zachary J. Kelton, Fairly Presenting Federal Claims to
the State Courts: Recent Developments in Preserving Federal Claims for Subsequent
Federal Court Review, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 485, 502–03 (2005) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme
Court [has] specifically noted that the ‘process of “winnowing out weaker claims on appeal
and focusing on” those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is
the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.’” (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1986))).
214
See SUP. CT. R. 18(12).
215
SUP. CT. R. 20(4)(b) (“Neither the denial of the petition, without more, nor an
order of transfer to a district court under the authority of 28 U. S. C. § 2241(b), is an
adjudication on the merits, and therefore does not preclude further application to another
court for the relief sought.”).
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[T]hese statutes might be characterized as forcing the hand of the Court,
by prompting it to decide cases that it might not otherwise, without the
benefit of an initial appellate review in that case. Moreover, being, in
effect, compelled to decide a case might deprive the Court of the
presumed benefits of permitting a legal issue to percolate in the lower
courts before certiorari of a particular case is granted.216
As Professor Solimine further explains, the Court actually reviews appeals
from three-judge district courts much in the same way it handles certiorari
petitions, with a summary decision.217 But these decisions create binding law on
the issue.218 Thus, the Supreme Court is often asked to decide important election
law issues prematurely and render binding precedent on a question that it may not
be ready to resolve.219
Moreover, because the Court must decide every case, it might do so without a
full analysis, instead issuing a summary opinion that provides little guidance on the
Court’s holding and no rationale for restricting voting rights. This nearly occurred
in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,220 a case that has come to stand for
the importance of the right to vote as a fundamental right.221 But that was almost
not to be. When the justices first tallied their votes regarding Virginia’s poll tax,
they came out 6–3 to uphold the Virginia law using a summary affirmance, without
any published analysis.222 Justice Goldberg, however, circulated a dissenting
opinion—which led several justices to change their votes—highlighting that “[t]his
affirmance, although summary, constitutes a holding by this Court that such poll
taxes imposed upon citizens too poor to pay them are constitutional.”223 He further
lamented that because the case arose as an appeal from a three-judge court, the
Supreme Court was required to render a decision on the merits, prompting him to
issue an opinion explaining his opposition.224 “Whatever may have been my
decision as to whether or not certiorari should be granted on this issue, since this
case is on appeal, I am compelled to face up to the substantial constitutional issue
presented.”225 Ultimately, Justice Goldberg’s view prevailed.226 The three-judge
district court process, however, forced the Supreme Court’s hand. This
demonstrates that the Court can do more harm than good if it issues a summary

216

Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development
of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 797 (2007).
217
See Solimine, supra note 70, at 107–08.
218
See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
219
See Solimine, supra note 70, at 107–08.
220
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
221
Id. at 670.
222
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 37 (2003).
223
Id. at 177.
224
Id. at 177–78 n.1.
225
Id.
226
Id.
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opinion without explanation regarding a constitutional question that it must
resolve.
Another negative consequence stemming from three-judge district courts is
that they mismatch judicial roles: three-judge courts must make evidentiary rulings
and initial factual findings, which are normally within the province of a single
district judge.227 Indeed, appellate judges are generally inexperienced in this sort of
judging, normally deferring to the district court unless the fact finding is clearly
erroneous.228 Thus, the process of fact finding is inherently more difficult for a
three-judge district court that includes a circuit judge. It also may be laborious for
trial judges to share the fact finding process with other judges when they are used
to undertaking fact finding alone, which can make the process arduous and
acrimonious. For example, in McConnell v. FEC,229 the three judges on the district
court panel took shots at each other in their separate opinions regarding the length
of time it took the court to dispose of the case, disputing whether the delay was the
result of the enormous discovery and voluminous record or instead was the fault of
the panel majority that simply failed to decide the case expeditiously.230 The

227

See Caminker, supra note 208, at 41 (“The structure of and tasks assigned to trial
courts encourage their relative proficiency at factfinding.”). The three-judge district court
statute allows a single judge to enter any order permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but that decision is still reviewable by the full three-judge court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284(b)(3) (2006). The full three-judge panel also must make the ultimate factual
findings. Id.
228
See Caminker, supra note 208, at 41–42 (noting that the functional differences
between appellate and district court judges mean that appellate judges are “likely to be
more proficient at the declaration of law than are district courts”). Similarly, district judges
are likely more proficient at fact finding, and asking a three-judge panel of district and
circuit judges to complete this task is not necessarily the easiest or best way of reaching
accurate and quick decisions. See Solimine, supra note 70, at 116 (“Given the factfinding
that typically occurs at the trial level, it is difficult to believe that increasing the number of
decisionmakers, in itself, leads to easier, quicker, or more accurate findings.”).
229
251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam) (three-judge court).
230
See id. at 266–67 n.1 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 207 n.36, 209 n.41 (per curiam). As Professor Solimine explains,
The controversial nature of the lower court proceedings in McConnell is
not that unusual for three-judge district court litigation. . . . Requiring three
jurists to make and agree upon such findings, especially in a very complex case,
can produce the sort of disagreement and awkwardness found in McConnell.
Nor can the sniping of the judges go unnoticed. Perhaps it is due in part to the
fact that this amalgam of judges normally does not sit together. District judges
rarely decide cases together, and trial judges and appellate judges usually act
separately. Moreover, trial judges presumably have considerable experience
managing discovery, making findings of fact, and engaging in a myriad of tasks
relevant to litigation at the trial court level, and rarely act in an appellate
capacity at that level. The reverse would be true for appellate judges. While all
of the federal judges in the District of Columbia share close quarters, it does not

466

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

Supreme Court also typically defers to the district court’s initial fact finding (with
the benefit of the intermediate appellate court’s review of that fact finding),231 but
in this system, the Court must take on the initial appellate review. As the Supreme
Court has explained, “[w]here an intermediate court reviews, and affirms, a trial
court’s factual findings, this Court will not ‘lightly overturn’ the concurrent
findings of the two lower courts. But in this instance there is no intermediate court,
and we are the only court of review.”232 The Court concluded, therefore, that it had
no choice but to analyze the district court’s factual findings in greater detail.233
Thus, the three-judge district court with direct Supreme Court review places
judges outside of their comfort zones: a circuit court judge must make initial
factual findings, district judges must collaborate in their factual findings, and the
Supreme Court is not able to benefit from an intermediate appellate court’s review
of the district court’s decision.
Finally, three-judge district courts do not necessarily eliminate the main
concern that led to their creation: eradicating the appearance that partisan judges
have too much power in shaping the political structure of our democracy through
their decisions, i.e., ideologically-driven decision making.234 Although multiple
judges can limit the power of one partisan judge, there is nothing inherent in the
structure of three-judge panels that necessarily helps to eliminate partisanship.235
Indeed, given that the chief of the circuit picks the judges for every three-judge
panel, it is possible that the chief’s ideology might shine through the selections.236
This may or may not actually occur. Professor Solimine examined eighty-nine
three-judge courts from 1976–1994 and found little evidence of partisan courtpacking, suggesting that partisanship may not affect three-judge courts as much as
it could.237 But this does not eliminate the potential of ideologically-driven
necessarily follow that they are comfortable in engaging in joint decision
making.
Solimine, supra note 216, at 777–78.
231
See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 425 (2007)
(explaining the Supreme Court’s view that “[t]rial judges are not only in a better position to
assess the credibility of live witnesses, but they also have superior expertise and greater
experience determining facts.”); see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–
75 (1985) (“The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in
fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of
appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination
at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”).
232
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242–43 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
233
Id. at 243.
234
Solimine, supra note 70, at 134–35.
235
Indeed, Professors Cox and Miles found that partisanship is a very strong predictor
of how a judge on a three-judge district court will vote in a Voting Rights Act case. See
Cox & Miles, supra note 61, at 18–29.
236
See Solimine, supra note 70 at 110–115; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Right to
Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1729 (1993).
237
Solimine, supra note 70, at 114.
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decision making or the perception that it happens. Nor does it provide an
institutionalized mechanism for limiting the chief judge’s ability to affect case
outcomes.238 Moreover, any system that uses a subset of judges will suffer the
possibility that the decision will be based on the luck of the draw.239 Of course,
even an entire court—such as the Supreme Court or a full en banc court—can
exhibit ideological decision making. But there is nothing about the structure of
using a full court, besides the selection process of federal judges itself,240 that
contributes to the appearance that partisanship is highly relevant to the decision.
By contrast, the structure of three-judge courts invites the perception that ideology
plays a large role in the process because the ideology of the particular panel
members is often a key predictor of the decision.241
Three-judge district courts, with direct review to the Supreme Court,
ultimately have some virtues that are important in election law cases: quick
resolution, an air of greater accuracy and legitimacy, and the symbolism of
increased scrutiny for particularly important cases, to name a few. But they also
have less desirable features, such as forcing the Supreme Court to decide an issue
earlier than it may wish, a misallocation of tasks in the judicial decision-making
process, and the possible perpetuation of the view that ideology drives the
decisions. This process, despite being a staple of the VRA and certain campaign
finance litigation, is thus not the most ideal system, although it certainly has
aspects we should retain in any court regime for election law cases.
C. Single District Judge with Direct Review to the En Banc Circuit Court
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 provides the third
process by which election law cases move through the federal courts. Under
section 437h of the statute, eligible plaintiffs can assert constitutional challenges to
the Act to a district court (single district judge), with direct certification of the
dispute to the court of appeals sitting en banc:
[T]he [Federal Election] Commission, the national committee of any
political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the
238

See Tracy E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal
Theory and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008)
(describing a chief judge’s formal and informal powers and suggesting that “[i]n the end,
chief judges who are so inclined can find ways to affect assignments”).
239
See, e.g., Cox & Miles, supra note 235, at 18–29.
240
See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001) (“When a party wins the White House, it
can stock the federal judiciary with members of its own party, assuming a relatively
acquiescent Senate.”); see also FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS 19 (2007) (“[R]esearchers have presumed that judges appointed by Democrats
are ideologically liberal whereas those appointed by Republicans are ideologically
conservative.”).
241
See, e.g., Cox & Miles, supra note 235, at 18–29.
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office of President may institute such actions in the appropriate district
court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as
may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of
this Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of
constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the
circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.242
Although the legislative history of section 437h is sparse, it appears that the
drafters of the FECA included this provision to ensure quick adjudication of
constitutional questions given the importance of resolving disputes surrounding an
election. Senator James Buckley, who planned to raise constitutional objections to
the FECA, explained the inclusion of the timeliness provision as follows:
[I]t is a modification that I am sure will prove acceptable to the
managers of the bill. It merely provides for the expeditious review of the
constitutional questions I have raised. I am sure we will all agree that if,
in fact, there is a serious question as to the constitutionality of this
legislation, it is in the interest of everyone to have the question
determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time.243
Similarly, in the House, Representative William Frenzel responded to a
colleague’s question regarding the constitutionality of the FECA by noting,
Any time we pass legislation in this field we are causing
constitutional doubts to be raised. I have many myself. I think the
gentleman has pointed out a good one. We have done the best we could
to bring out a bill which we hope may pass the constitutional test. But,
we do not doubt that some questions will be raised quickly.
I do call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that any individual
under this bill has a direct method to raise these questions and to have
those considered as quickly as possible by the Supreme Court.244
Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in explaining that
section 437h was to be strictly construed, observed that “[t]hese brief remarks by
242

2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006). The only other federal law with a similar procedure—
direct review to the en banc circuit court—is the Emergency Energy Conservation
Program. See 42 U.S.C. § 8514(a)(2) (2006). This procedure was also part of the House
report accompanying the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments
of 1988, but it did not make it into the final bill. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-939, at 64 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3474, 3513. But see 7 U.S.C. § 136n (2006) (outlining a
judicial review procedure that does not include automatic en banc consideration). Louisiana
law provides for direct en banc appeal of a trial court’s decision in a post-election contest
regarding the winner of the election. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(H).
243
120 CONG. REC. 10,562 (1974).
244
120 CONG. REC. 35,140 (1974).
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two Members of Congress nearly exhaust the legislative history of the section.”245
Thus, it appears that the driving force behind mandating direct en banc review was
to ensure timeliness and comprehensive decision making on a question as
important as the constitutionality of a law affecting elections.246
The timeliness factor inherent in section 437h was actually a lot stronger in
the original formulation of the statute. Initially, section 437h provided for direct
nondiscretionary review to the Supreme Court,247 and it included a provision
requiring the en banc court of appeals and the Supreme Court “to advance on the
docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter”
the district court had certified under this section.248 Congress eliminated these
portions of section 437h as part of its overall goal of limiting the Supreme Court’s
mandatory docket249 and giving the courts greater control over the order in which it
hears cases.250 Thus, although the mechanism itself allows for faster adjudication
by skipping the three-judge panel stage of appellate review, the statute in its
current form propounds watered-down timeliness.
The Supreme Court has heard only two cases deriving from section 437h’s
direct en banc procedure—and both occurred when the statute included mandatory
Supreme Court review.251 The most famous case arising under section 437h is
Buckley v. Valeo.252 Buckley presented the initial broad-based constitutional
challenge to the FECA.253 In fact, Senator Buckley invoked the very procedures on
timeliness he had included in the bill to challenge the constitutionality of much of
245

Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 583 (1982) (holding that
only the three types of plaintiffs explicitly listed in the statute may invoke the section’s
expedited procedures).
246
See Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (“Congress was concerned
that its extensive amendments to the Act in 1974 might raise important constitutional
questions requiring quick resolution . . . .”); id. at 190 (“It is undisputed that this provision
was included in the 1974 Amendments to the Act to provide a mechanism for the rapid
resolution of constitutional challenges to the Act.”); see also Bread Political Action Comm.
v. FEC, 591 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1979) (“Thus three Congressional purposes are clear:
comprehensive review, speedy review, and ultimate review by our highest court of
constitutional challenges to the Act.”), overruled by Bread, 455 U.S. at 585.
247
2 U.S.C. § 437h(b) (1982) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
decision on a matter certified under subsection (a) of this section shall be reviewable by
appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Such appeal shall be brought no
later than 20 days after the decision of the court of appeals.”), repealed by Pub. L. No. 100352, § 6(a), 102 Stat. 662, 663 (1988).
248
2 U.S.C. § 437h(c) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 402(1)(B), 98 Stat.
3335, 3357 (1984).
249
H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 11 (1988) (explaining that the “Supreme Court should
be granted greater authority to determine its docket”).
250
Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 401(a), 98 Stat. at 3356–57.
251
Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
8 (1976); see also id. at 8 n.4
252
424 U.S. 1.
253
Id. at 6.
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the Act soon after it became law.254 Reviewing a robust decision from the en banc
D.C. Circuit Court255 (consolidated with a related three-judge court decision256),
the Supreme Court upheld portions of the law and struck down others, ruling that
limits on campaign contributions, as well as disclosure and reporting requirements,
are constitutional, but that limits on campaign expenditures are not.257 The second
case stemming from section 437h is California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, in which the
Court upheld FECA’s annual limit for individuals and unincorporated associations
to contribute to multicandidate political committees.258 The Supreme Court has not
granted certiorari on any case that was certified to the en banc circuit court under
section 437h after Congress removed the direct review provision.259
A few years after the tumultuous Buckley litigation, Judge Harold Leventhal
of the D.C. Circuit Court wrote a law review article lambasting section 437h’s
“most unusual procedure.”260 He highlighted his many objections to certification of
questions to the en banc court, direct Supreme Court review, and the duty to
expedite the decision:
The benefit of expedition is one thing. But the straitjacket of the
particular procedure, more like a headlong gallop than a brisk canter, was
not debated by Congress. There is wisdom in removing that unusual
procedure from the law. The system bypasses the benefit of a recordmaking procedure, and while this could be recaptured in part by the kind
of remand used by the District of Columbia Circuit [in Buckley], even
this was trial by rapid-fire combat, under the gun of a legislative call for
haste. The use of certified questions on an expedited basis encourages an
abstract approach to constitutional decision-making—the kind of
approach which proved unworkable in the reapportionment context.

254

See id. at 7–8.
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
256
Although the bulk of the case went before the D.C. district court, which certified
questions to the en banc D.C. Circuit, a separate three-judge panel considered and rejected
a challenge to related Internal Revenue Code provisions. See Buckely v. Valeo, 401 F.
Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975) (three-judge court). For a jurisprudential history of Buckley v.
Valeo, see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., Foundation Press)
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1593253.
257
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
258
Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981).
259
The three-judge district court/direct Supreme Court review mechanism from the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act is actually in the note following 2 U.S.C. § 437h, and the
Court has heard several cases in recent years under this provision. See supra Part III.B.
260
Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 384
(1977).
255
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As for en banc hearings, these, if anything, tend to be counterproductive in terms of expedition. Appellate courts like the United States
courts of appeals, which are accustomed to working in small panels, have
difficulty in expediting their en banc determinations. The ingenuity of
counsel in articulating constitutional questions lends itself to minor,
perhaps frivolous issues, and the instruction for compulsory appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is contrary to all recent studies and
thinking concerning that Court.261
Despite Judge Leventhal’s apprehension, however, certification of questions
to the en banc court has endured, albeit infrequently invoked. Since 2000, there are
only three reported en banc decisions stemming from a district court’s section 437h
certification: one in 2000 and two in 2010.262 But this does not necessarily mean
that the provision is meaningless. Instead, given that the FECA is over thirty years
old,263 it simply might signal that the constitutionality of the Act is well settled.
Indeed, Buckley itself resolved many of the original constitutional objections to
FECA.264 It may be, then, that there is simply a diminished need for plaintiffs to
challenge the FECA because there are few nonfrivolous challenges they might be
able to raise. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Supreme Court’s recent
invitation of as-applied challenges in election law will lead to a corresponding
increase in as-applied constitutional challenges to the Act.265 In fact, after a decade
of almost no en banc decisions under section 437h, very recently two en banc
courts have considered as-applied challenges to the FECA.266 Thus, the
section 437h procedure may see a renewed vitality.
One problem that can arise under section 437h occurs when the district court
certifies only some issues to the en banc court and dismisses others as frivolous,
and the plaintiff wishes to appeal that adverse decision. In that circumstance, there
is the possibility of parallel proceedings at the court of appeals. A three-judge
261

Id. at 385.
Cao v. FEC (In re Cao), 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting a
challenge to various applications of the FECA), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011);
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that, in light of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), the
FECA’s contribution limits were unconstitutional as applied to an unincorporated nonprofit
association, but upholding the disclosure and reporting requirements); Mariani v. United
States, 212 F.3d 761 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to
FECA’s ban of hard money contributions from corporate treasuries).
263
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006)).
264
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding individual campaign contribution
limits and reporting requirements, but striking down self-funding limits for candidates and
total expenditure limits for campaigns).
265
See Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied
Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 635 (2009).
266
Cao, 619 F.3d at 414; SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 689.
262
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panel will hear the appeal of the district court’s decision rejecting certain claims as
frivolous, while the en banc court will consider the certified questions. The
standards of review—and even the questions presented—will be different: the
three-judge panel will determine whether the district court correctly held that the
challenge was frivolous and therefore not worthy of certification under an abuse of
discretion standard, while the en banc court will review the constitutional
challenge de novo.267 The Fifth Circuit recently faced this conundrum, but instead
of having parallel proceedings, it decided to hear all issues at its en banc session.268
This process was arguably inconsistent with the statute, which does not empower
the en banc court to consider the noncertified questions, but none of the parties
objected to this process.269 As Part IV discusses, eliminating the possibility of split
proceedings is one fix required of this procedure.
Besides the parallel proceedings concern, however, section 437h does not
seem to impose any other major structural deficiencies such as those inherent in
the traditional three-tiered approach270 or the three-judge district court.271 Judge
Leventhal’s concerns thus are overstated. He is correct that the procedure does not
invite detailed fact finding at the district court.272 But the process of going from a
single district judge, who weeds out frivolous cases and makes preliminary
findings of facts, to the en banc circuit court for the resolution of legal questions,
has much to commend it.
For one, although previously the statute included a specific instruction to the
courts to decide cases expeditiously,273 even without that mandate, it still
inherently promotes timeliness. Not only does this process limit the scope of the
district court’s decision and skip the three-judge panel, it also signals to the full
circuit court that the case is particularly important and should be handled at the
next en banc session.274 Indeed, recent en banc courts have heeded this message. In
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument on January 27, 2010,

267

Cao, 619 F.3d at 415.
Order Consolidating Appeals, Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (No. 10-30080) (“The court has
sua sponte consolidated the above appeals for briefing and oral argument purposes. The
parties’ briefs on all issues should be consolidated, but you are warned to clarify the
differing standards of review that will apply to the separate facets of these cases.”).
269
Cao, 619 F.3d at 415 (“For purposes of judicial economy and efficiency, we
consolidated the Plaintiffs’ appeal of the dismissal of the non-certified questions with the
court’s en banc consideration of the certified questions.”).
270
See supra Part III.A.
271
See supra Part III.B.
272
Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193 n.14 (1981) (“[A]s a practical matter,
immediate adjudication of constitutional claims through a § 437h proceeding would be
improper in cases where the resolution of such questions required a fully developed factual
record.”).
273
2 U.S.C. § 437h(b), (c) (1976).
274
See George, supra note 110, at 1667–68 (“[The en banc] procedure creates the
presumption that the cases are likely to involve difficult, complex, highly political, or at
least significant questions.”).
268
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and rendered its decision on March 26, 2010.275 In Cao v. FEC, the Fifth Circuit
heard oral argument on May 25, 2010, and issued its opinion on September 10,
2010, reviewing a decision the district court had issued just over eight months
earlier.276
The use of multiple judges also enhances the likelihood that litigants and the
public will perceive the decision as accurate and legitimate. Instinctively, it makes
sense that the more judges on a panel, the greater chance for tempering of extreme
views, compromise, and reasoned analysis.277 The whole point of multimember
panels is to ensure that judges with different viewpoints and experiences have the
ability to make their voices heard.278 Even if the decision of a multimember panel
is not actually more “accurate” than a single judge’s decision, it is likely to be
perceived as better reasoned because of the nature of give-and-take on an appellate
court. Ideologues or those most invested in the outcome who may not like the
decision are still unlikely to view the court’s authority as illegitimate, especially if
a dissent airs the opposing side’s position.279 Section 437h promotes the goals of
accuracy and legitimacy by having the full en banc court undertake the
275

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Cao v. FEC (In re Cao), 619 F.3d 410, 410 (5th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct.
1718 (2011); Cao v. FEC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 498, 498 (E.D. La. 2010) (decided Jan. 27,
2010).
277
See George, supra note 110, at 1695.
278
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning:
Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 739 (2008) (“The multimember
panel studies indicate that the votes of judges are influenced by the ideologies of other
judges on the same panel. Either to maintain collegiality, to avoid a judge’s breaking away
to author a dissenting opinion, or simply because of group dynamics, judges appear to
moderate their voting in settings where there is potential diversity in political views.”);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1664
(2010) (noting that in the immigration context, “[m]ultimember panels . . . reduce the
probability that a single individual with a strong ideology (in either direction) will reach an
extreme result . . . . They do this by diffusing subjective biases, permitting deliberation, and
promoting consensus.”); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2008) (using empirical analysis of bankruptcy cases to
demonstrate that, with respect to achieving accuracy, or at least a perception of accuracy,
“multimember tribunals that adhere to traditional notions of appellate hierarchy and that
have subject-matter expertise in the area of the appeal appear to be desirable”).
279
For example, the vigorous opinions in Bush v. Gore on both sides might have
actually helped the Court weather the storm from an inherently political and (for a large
segment of the population) unpopular decision. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush
v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32,
33 (2001) (“The Court’s action in Bush v. Gore was dramatic, subject to intense media
coverage, and controversial, but the effects on public perceptions and knowledge of the
Court were modest.”); cf. Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics,
Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REV.
653, 671 (2001) (arguing that in analyzing the issues in Bush v. Gore, the justices should
have taken into consideration whether that decision would appear principled to the public).
276
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constitutional analysis in the first instance.280 It places the difficult questions about
the constitutional legitimacy of creating rules for democratically electing our
leaders directly in the hands of the largest already-constituted group of judges in
our federal court system, thereby minimizing the influence of a single district
judge or a random selection of three appellate judges. This tempers a concern that
the ideology of a randomly selected judge will unduly influence the outcome. It
also leads to a greater perception of accuracy and legitimacy for the court’s
decisions.
Further, unlike for the three-judge district court, section 437h generally
promotes each type of judge’s expertise and proper judicial role: district judges
decide preliminary matters and factual issues, and appellate judges decide
constitutional questions.281 True, district judges are not supposed to make detailed
factual findings under section 437h.282 Appellate judges also are not reviewing a
lower court decision, as the district court simply certifies constitutional questions
to the en banc court without rendering an initial decision on their merit.283 Section
437h is thus not perfect in best using each judge’s skills. But it at least cogently
separates a district judge’s factual findings from an appellate court’s legal analysis
on the constitutional questions.
Section 437h also demonstrates Congress’s commitment to recognizing the
significance of election law litigation. When a case goes en banc, the lawyers hone
their arguments, the judges refocus their energies, and the public is told, “This is
an important one.” En banc cases have greater weight than decisions of a threejudge panel because the decision speaks for the entire court.284 The nature of en
banc review thus signals the importance of the issues to all involved. Section 437h
does this for constitutional challenges to the FECA, highlighting the importance of
the proper functioning of that law to our electoral practices.
Thus, a process such as section 437h that leads to quick en banc adjudication
fosters many of the goals identified in Part II: timeliness, accuracy, legitimacy,
minimization of ideology, use of each judge’s expertise, and signaling. As Part IV
explores, section 437h provides a strong launching point for creating a uniform
procedure for election law cases in federal courts. It simply needs refinement and
broader application.

280

See 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006).
See supra Part II.E.
282
Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193–94 n.14 (1981).
283
See 2 U.S.C. § 437h.
284
See, e.g., Brown v. First Nat’l Bank in Lenox, 844 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1988)
(“[O]ne panel of this Court is not at liberty to overrule an opinion filed by another panel.
Only the Court en banc may take such a step.”).
281
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D. DISCLOSE Act
In response to the Supreme Court’s highly controversial decision in Citizens
United v. FEC, Democrats in Congress introduced the DISCLOSE Act.285 The law
was intended to strengthen disclosure requirements for corporate campaign
contributions and place limits on political contributions from foreign
corporations.286 The bill, which passed the House but not the Senate,287 provided
that any constitutional challenges to the law must be filed in the D.C. District
Court, with appeal to a regular three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit.288 The
judicial review procedures in the law were thus different from any of the currently
used processes for election law cases.289 In essence, Congress provided for the
regular three-tiered review procedure, but designated the venue as the D.C. federal
courts. The bill also stated that a member of Congress could intervene in any
constitutional challenge or bring his or her own challenge to the law.290
Notably, the House rejected an alternative bill sponsored by Representative
Dan Lungren of California that provided for expedited judicial review through a
three-judge district court, much like in the Voting Rights Act and Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act cases.291 Representative Lungren and Representative Lamar
Smith of Texas, both Republicans, took to the House floor to denounce the
omission of an expedited review procedure in the Democrats’ bill.292
Representative Lungren accused the Democrats supporting the bill of intentionally
285

Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act, H.R.
5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
286
H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 102.
287
See Michael A. Memoli, ‘Disclose Act’ Fails to Advance in Senate; The Bill
Would Require Greater Transparency on Political Donations by Corporations, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at 2.
288
See H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 401(a)(1).
289
Id. The judicial review provision of the bill reads, in pertinent part:
(a) SPECIAL RULES FOR ACTIONS BROUGHT ON CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS.— If any action is brought for declaratory or injunctive relief to
challenge the constitutionality of any provision of this Act or any amendment
made by this Act, the following rules shall apply:
(1) The action shall be filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and an appeal from a decision of the District Court may be
taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
(2) A copy of the complaint shall be delivered promptly to the Clerk of the
House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate.
Id.
290

Id. § 401(b).
See 156 CONG. REC. H4826 (daily ed. June 24, 2010) (statement of Rep. Smith)
(DISCLOSE Act debate).
292
Id.
291
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failing to include expedited review in an effort to ensure that the Supreme Court
would not interpret the law before the 2010 elections.293 That is, Representative
Lungren suggested that Democrats were afraid the Court would strike down the
bill but still wanted to create uncertainty on the lawfulness of—and a
corresponding chill on—corporate campaign expenditures for the upcoming
midterm election.294
The debate on the judicial review provision of the DISCLOSE Act tells us
some important things about the procedure of election law cases. For one,
Congress is well aware that it needs to consider how election law cases proceed
through the courts, and it actively debates these issues when drafting new election
laws. But Congress’s focus is misplaced. Members of Congress seek to employ
judicial review for their own partisan purposes, instead of contemplating the
institutional and structural aspects of the judicial review procedure they select.295
Representative Lungren accused Democrats of stalling any review of the
DISCLOSE Act in an effort to affect the upcoming elections while himself seeking
faster review to ensure court consideration before the elections, likely because he
believed implementation of the law would help Democrats and hurt Republicans.
This is largely the same debate Senator Buckley had with respect to section 437h
in the FECA.296 Members of Congress use the insertion of a particular judicial
review process to slow down or speed up court interpretation of a new election law
depending on their support of or opposition to the law, which can affect whether
that law applies in an upcoming election.
293

Id. Representative Lungren admonished:

This bill does not have the expedited appellate procedure that we’ve had in
every other campaign finance law. And what this motion to recommit does is
says that same process that we’ve had which allows an expedited review of the
underlying constitutionality of this bill will be in this bill as it has been in the
past. Why? Because we are dealing with the First Amendment to the
Constitution, and people ought to know sooner rather than later whether the law
we passed is constitutional.
If in fact your intent is to ensure there is vagueness for this election period
so that those who are protected in this bill—that is, the exemptions given to the
unions applies, but there is uncertainty on the part of other corporate entities,
either for-profit or not-for-profit, that will have a chilling effect on the latter
group, and that will create an uneven playing field for the balance of this
election period. The only way in which you might not have that uneven playing
field is to have an expedited consideration all the way to the Supreme Court of
the underlying constitutionality.
Id.
294

Id.
See Solimine, supra note 216, at 773 (“Supporters, or critics, of legislation can in
various ways use particularized judicial review provisions to attempt to shape preferred
policy outcomes with respect to application of the statute.”).
296
See supra Part III.C.
295
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But, as discussed above, unique judicial processes for election law cases
produce unintended consequences.297 Moreover, Congress’s criteria for
implementing a judicial review procedure are misguided. On an issue as highly
charged as campaign finance, it is difficult, if not impossible, for members of
Congress to separate their partisan motivations from best practices for judicial
review. This underscores the need for Congress to create, outside the context of a
substantive election law, a uniform procedure for these cases. Instead of attempting
to manipulate the judicial review process based on whether a representative
supports or opposes a particular law, Congress should enact a uniform procedure
for all election law cases that is tied to the goals identified in Part II. Part IV
proposes a solution.
IV. CREATING A UNIFORM PROCEDURAL MECHANISM FOR ELECTION LAW CASES
IN FEDERAL COURTS
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there are several procedures federal
courts use for election law cases. But many of these processes do not promote the
goals we seek to achieve in adjudicating election law disputes, which are often the
most highly salient and partisan decisions judges make.298 Among the problems
with the current approaches are that the three-tiered system is slow and laborious,
the three-judge district court misplaces judicial expertise and requires premature
Supreme Court decision making, and there is a perception that ideology drives
election law outcomes.299
To avoid these concerns, we need not reinvent the wheel. Rather, it is possible
to promulgate a single process that can best achieve quick, accurate, and fair
judicial review of election laws. In fact, although it needs tweaking, one procedure
already stands above the others in balancing the requirements of the judicial
system with the importance of election law disputes: the direct en banc review
process of title 2, section 437h of the United States Code. This Part proposes a
modification to the procedure outlined in section 437h, which Congress should
adopt for election law cases heard in federal courts. This Article terms this system
merits-based direct en banc review.
To begin, judicial processes for election law cases should be uniform, as a
single procedure for all election law cases in federal courts can enhance clarity,
predictability, and the perception of fairness.300 Although many people are
297

See supra Part III.A, III.B.
See Heather K. Gerken, The Texas and Pennsylvania Partisan Gerrymandering
Cases—Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal
Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 520 (2004) (“The Court does not avoid making
political judgments in election law cases. It simply cloaks those judgments in the ill-fitting
garb of individual rights.”); Hasen, supra note 16, at 102 (explaining that election law
cases are “highly salient” and often viewed as turning on “partisan consideration[s]”).
299
See supra Part III.A, III.B.
300
Uniformity is a common virtue for election administration. For example, Congress
premised the Help America Vote Act, its latest major attempt to overhaul the country’s
298
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skeptical of using the courts to decide election disputes, a judicial role for elections
is not going away.301 A consistent approach will help litigants know what to
expect, ensure that elected leaders do not promulgate procedures solely to entrench
themselves or their party in positions of leadership,302 and harmonize the
judiciary’s role in affecting and deciding elections. There is no discernable reason
for having multiple processes unless they are related to specific goals inherent in
the cases falling within their scope.303 Creating a uniform procedure for all election
law cases, outside the context of a specific substantive election provision, also will
eliminate the possibility that members of Congress will attempt to insert a review
mechanism in a particular law to speed up or slow down judicial interpretation of
that law, which is exactly what occurred in the DISCLOSE Act debate.304
Other features of the new process that this Article proposes include involving
the highest number of judges practicable (thus promoting greater accuracy),
providing for timely adjudication, and protecting the judiciary’s legitimacy in
deciding election law cases. Further, although no system can completely eliminate
the role of ideology, merits-based direct en banc review can best minimize judges’
ideological predilections. Finally, adopting this procedure will signal to the court,
litigants, and society that election law cases are vitally important, both in terms of
the accuracy required and in the implications the decisions will have for the
foundation of our political system. In short, an expedited three-tiered process with
direct en banc review best promotes the goals identified in Part II and provides a
clear mechanism that defines when and how courts should become involved in
election law disputes.305
voting processes, on the virtues of “Uniform and Nondiscriminatory Election Technology
and Administration Requirements.” See 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (2006).
301
Cf., e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Laura Jane Durfee, Leaving the Thicket at Last?,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417, 421 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should remove itself
from deciding election law cases because the Court’s incoherent intervention in the
political system may not be worth the cost); Karlan, supra note 46, at 695–98 (arguing that
the Court should minimize its intervention in the democratic process).
302
HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 15 (2009); see also Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in
Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 787, 789 (2009) (book review) (“First, the heart of The
Democracy Index establishes that the central problem for legal reform in election
administration—and a central concern of election law—is the political self-interest of
lawmakers locking themselves into office. Election law structures the incentives and
restrictions on the process by which lawmakers, who make the election law that governs
them, gain and maintain public office. The risk of incumbent entrenchment is not unique to
election law, but it is the defining concern of this area of law, just as Gerken suggests.”).
303
For example, post-election contests regarding the winner of an election might
benefit from a unique procedure.
304
See supra Part III.D.
305
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 306 (“It . . . is fundamentally important, both for
courts and for the strength of our elections, that our political communities establish clearer
and more objective standards for when and how courts should void or adjust a flawed
election.”).
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Here is how merits-based direct en banc review would work: A litigant files
an election law case, either challenging an election practice or questioning the
constitutionality of an election statute. The case is first assigned to a district judge.
That judge is directed to move the case to the top of the docket, thus fostering
timeliness of decision making.306 The judge expedites discovery,307 briefing, and
hearings, and then renders a decision in the case in a timely fashion. As with most
cases, judges should pay particular attention to resolving any disputed facts. That
is, judges will fulfill their typical role in handling the case, with the exception
that—because it is an election law case—the judge is charged to act expediently.
Judges also must decide if any of the challenges are frivolous, throwing out those
aspects of the case in which no reasonable mind could differ (much like a judge
might dismiss certain aspects of a case through Rule 12(b)(6)).308 The findings of
fact and dismissal of frivolous claims will provide litigants with an initial timely
assessment of the merits of the case, giving the losing side an indication of whether
it is worth pursuing particular issues at the appellate level.
The losing party can then appeal any merits-based decision directly to the en
banc court. For any issues that the district court dismissed based on frivolity, the
chief judge of the circuit shall have the power to refer those issues to the full en

306

Of course, the most expeditious process would be to have only one level of judges,
with no possibility of review. Indeed, some states use this procedure for election contests.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-172 (1991). As Professor Huefner explains, “Especially if
some election contests receive de novo review in appellate courts anyway, it might be both
more efficient and most expeditious to combine the trial and the appeal into a single event.”
Huefner, supra note 18, at 315. However, eliminating multiple levels of review would
deprive the process of other important virtues, such as fostering legitimacy and accuracy,
providing all parties with the sense that the judiciary gave them a fair shot during the
litigation, and ensuring that judges take on roles consistent with their particular expertise
(fact finding or legal decision making). Achieving all of the goals requires a balance;
elevating timeliness over all other goals would minimize the others.
Moreover, the mere presence of the possibility of an appeal incentivizes judges to try
to make the “correct” (nonreversible) decision and lends legitimacy to the process because
society knows that there is an inherent error-correction mechanism within the procedure.
See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379, 379 (1995) (“[T]he appeals process allows society to harness information that
litigants have about erroneous decisions and thereby to reduce the incidence of mistake at
low cost (because the appeals tribunal convenes only in a subset of cases).”).
Furthermore,“if one reconsiders the possibility of multiple levels of appeal, then allowing
appeals at any level would have the advantage of improving judges’ incentives for
accuracy at all earlier levels of appeal (not just at trial).” Id. at 410–11.
307
See Huefner, supra note 18, at 315 (“A prolonged period of discovery, while
obviously conducive to a more accurate determination of election outcomes, is antithetical
to the need for a prompt and final determination.”).
308
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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banc court if reasonable minds could differ on their proper resolution.309 This
ensures that the dismissal of frivolous issues still receives appellate review
(through the chief judge) but does not bog down the full en banc court or require
parallel proceedings.310 It protects merits-based direct en banc review from
dilution, focusing the courts, litigants, and society on the important and salient
election-related questions.
The en banc stage will operate much as it does now for section 437h,311 with
one minor exception: the appellate court should give the district court’s findings of
fact slightly less deference than in a regular case. A heightened standard, such as a
requirement that the district court’s findings of fact be “clear and convincing,”
provides the en banc court with a better ability to root out incorrect or ideological
decisions.312 Providing too much deference to a district court’s fact finding raises
the concern that ideology or the whims of a single judge infused the decision;
requiring en banc courts to review the facts de novo usurps the district judge’s
normal powers and would be too burdensome. A modified standard (such as “clear
and convincing”) retains the overall benefits discussed earlier of using an en banc
court but still gives the district court a significant role in uncovering the facts of
the dispute. It thus combines the goals of preserving each judge’s typical role,
minimizing ideology, and ensuring accuracy.313 As for conclusions of law, much
like in all other cases the en banc court will review the decision de novo.314 That is,
the en banc court can benefit from the district court’s initial first pass on factual
309

This is similar to the Supreme Court’s rule allowing the circuit justice for a
particular circuit to dispose of an application for an emergency stay him or herself or refer
the question to the full Court for consideration. SUP. CT. R. 22, 23.
310
This contrasts with the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Cao. See Cao v. FEC (In re
Cao), 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011). See
supra notes 268–269 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit’s action in hearing the
frivolous claim en banc with the certified questions skirted the district court’s
determination that one of the challenges was frivolous, instead consolidating the appeal of
the dismissal based on frivolity and the certified questions “[f]or purposes of judicial
economy and efficiency.” Cao, 619 F.3d at 415. Allowing an appeal of frivolous issues to
circumvent the regular appeals process and go directly en banc with merits-based decisions
minimizes the benefits of direct en banc review and could overburden en banc courts. If
one judge has already determined that the challenge is frivolous, then the chief judge can
serve as a gatekeeper for the full court.
311
See supra Part III.C.
312
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2006) (providing that in habeas cases a federal court
reviews a state court’s factual findings for “clear and convincing” evidence).
313
Of course, requiring the en banc court to scrutinize the facts, even under a “clear
and convincing” standard, somewhat sacrifices the goal of timeliness at this stage of the
proceedings.
314
See, e.g., Churchill v. Fjord (In re McLinn), 739 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (explaining the virtues of de novo review by noting that “de novo review of
questions of law is dictated in part because of the precedential effect of those questions on
future litigants. While the trial courts’ factual determinations bind only the parties, the
determination of legal issues affects the rights of future litigants.”).
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questions while still engaging in robust deliberation on the legal issues. This
ensures that each level of court focuses on what it does best, and for the en banc
court, it allows it to decide both the difficult legal and factual disputes with the
benefit of the lower court’s analysis.
The court must decide the case at its next regularly scheduled en banc sitting,
or if there is no sitting scheduled within a certain time period (such as the next
three months), the court must convene specially to hear the case.315 Nevertheless,
the court must decide the case as expeditiously as possible.
Finally, the losing party at the en banc stage can seek certiorari review at the
Supreme Court.316 As the evidence above demonstrates, the Court operates best
when it is not forced to answer questions prematurely.317 The Court can allow en
banc courts to sort out most election law questions, reserving its resources for the
truly salient or difficult disputes. It can also rely on the en banc court’s review of
the district court’s findings of fact.
Merits-based direct en banc review is flexible enough to respond to the needs
of particular cases. For example, not every election law dispute is extremely
significant or important, requiring the full resources of an en banc sitting.
Convening en banc courts is not cheap—either institutionally or financially.318 But
315

The Ninth Circuit presents somewhat of an anomaly, as it does not include all of
its twenty-nine active judges in its en banc sittings but instead sits in “limited en banc”
panels of eleven judges. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. To maintain uniformity across the circuits
and to adhere to the goals discussed above, that court also should sit as a full en banc panel
to ensure that the decision benefits from the full court’s review. See Hon. John M. Roll,
The 115 Year-Old Ninth Circuit—Why a Split is Necessary and Inevitable, 7 WYO. L. REV.
109, 132–36 (2007) (explaining criticisms of the Ninth Circuit’s limited en banc
procedure); Hon. Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc: Half Full, or Half Empty?,
48 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (2006) (describing perceived flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s
limited en banc review).
316
Empirical evidence suggests that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant
certiorari on a case that a circuit court has heard en banc. See Tracey E. George & Michael
E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 195–96. Using direct en banc review for election law cases,
however, is unlikely to cause a marked increase in the Supreme Court’s election law
docket. Professors George and Solimine hypothesize that “the Supreme Court’s certiorari
decision is affected by the en banc nature of the lower court ruling in two ways: en banc
serves as a signal, and en banc cases are inherently more significant.” Id. at 196–97.
Congress has already signaled, however, that election law cases are more significant by
creating special procedures for their resolution. Increasing the use of en banc courts for
election law cases thus would further recognize, not amplify, the importance of these cases,
which is unlikely to affect the Supreme Court’s decision as to whether to hear these
disputes.
317
Solimine, supra note 216, at 797.
318
See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–
1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1018–37 (1991) (discussing the costs of rehearing
cases en banc); see also 5TH CIR. R. APP. P. 35.1 (explaining that “each request for en banc
consideration must be studied by every active judge of the court and is a serious call on
limited judicial resources”).
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not every en banc case requires oral argument or drawn out deliberations. Just like
in any other case, if the majority of judges believe the election case before the en
banc court is low stakes and unlikely to generate controversy among the judges,
then it can dispose of the case on the briefs or through a summary opinion.319
Further, judges need not convene in the same place for an easy case but can work
through electronic communication. Thus, while all active judges on the circuit
court still must review the case, the en banc court can preserve its resources for the
difficult or high-impact election law disputes.
Another feature of many election law judicial review provisions is that they
vest jurisdiction exclusively in the D.C. federal courts.320 But the D.C. federal
courts do not necessarily have any specialized expertise in election law.321
Limiting all election law cases to one court cuts against the ideals discussed above
(increasing the number of judges hearing a case to foster timeliness, accuracy,
legitimacy, and minimization of ideology). By contrast, having en banc courts
across the country decide election law cases allows issues to percolate and opens
the litigation process. Further, some issues may be unique to local elections and
would benefit from local judges.
There are many advantages, and few disadvantages, to merits-based direct en
banc review. First, it best promotes opportunities for “correct” decision making. As
discussed above, as a general matter, the greater number of judges involved in a
decision, the more likely it is to be correct.322 “[G]iven a reasonable understanding
of what the job of judging is and under reasonable assumptions about how well
319

In some circuits, the judges vote on whether to hold oral argument when voting on
whether to take a case en banc. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-10, INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES § 7; 5TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES following R. APP. P. 35-6;
see also Of Course, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 499 F.2d 754, 756 (4th Cir. 1974)
(“Since the issue presented by the appeal was legal and not factual and the record of the
oral argument of the parties before the panel was available to the en banc court, it was
concluded that oral argument might be dispensed with and the cause disposed of on the
record, written briefs of the parties and the tape of the oral argument before the original
panel.”); United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 1960) (explaining that the court
can dispose of a case en banc on the briefs only and that litigants do not have an “absolute
right to oral argument”); cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent,
and Variability in State Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 1451, 1459 (2009) (noting that some state Supreme Courts decide cases without
oral argument and through summary affirmances to manage the case load).
320
See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat.
81, 113–14 (2002) (“The action shall be filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and shall be heard by a 3-judge court convened pursuant to section
2284 of title 28, United States Code.”), 2 U.S.C. § 437h note (2006); Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (vesting preclearance decisions with the D.C. district court).
321
Cf. Solimine, supra note 216, at 773 (“Perhaps the supporters [of the BCRA]
thought a federal district court in the District of Columbia would, all things being equal,
possess more legal acumen and political sophistication than federal judges elsewhere, and
be more likely to uphold the law.”).
322
See George, supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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individual judges are likely to do it, enlarging the number of judges who sit on a
court can be expected to improve the court’s performance.”323 In fact, the whole
point of multimember panels is to increase the possibility of reaching the “correct”
result; en banc courts employ more judges to review the decision of a three-judge
panel, and three-judge panels review the decision of a single judge because of the
notion that the greater the number of judges, the better the decision will be as it
moves through the appellate process.324 Given that both accuracy and timeliness
are highly important in election law cases based on the foundational issues
involved, it makes sense to include as many judges as possible early in the process.
Stated differently, section 437h already assures comprehensiveness in
decision making. Assuming that there is actually a “correct” result that a court can
reach, the en banc system is the best mechanism to achieve that goal as quickly as
possible—particularly given that, under a certiorari system, the courts of appeals
are the last rung on the judicial ladder for most litigants.325 En banc courts benefit
from multiple viewpoints, and more extreme judges tend to moderate their
opinions to capture the votes of more mainstream judges.326 Intuitively, more legal
minds will be better at reaching the “correct” result than fewer legal minds;
moving directly to the en banc court ensures that the largest already-constituted
judicial panel will hear a case as early as practicable. Moreover, as compared to
randomly selected three-judge panels in a circuit, en banc courts promote
uniformity in decision making, as they eliminate the possibility of conflicting
decisions within a circuit or a result tainted by the panel draw.
Second, even if more judges does not mean greater accuracy as an empirical
matter, a decision from an en banc court would seem to enjoy greater legitimacy;
the more judges that sign on to an opinion, the more likely court-watchers and the
public will view it as the correct result.327 Of course, the general public may not be
able to differentiate meaningfully between a three-judge panel and the en banc
court. But to the extent that there is a choice in judicial structure, including more
judges early in the decision-making process can contribute to the perception of the
decision as stemming from reasoned and considered analysis. This in turn might
323

Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J.
82, 83 (1986); see also Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A
Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 834
(1993) (“[T]he aggregation of judgments of a judicially consistent group of judges will
create a greater ‘consistency’ in their decisions.”).
324
See Caminker, supra note 208, at 42 & n.155.
325
See Quinn, supra note 104, at 712; see also Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 334–35 (1941) (explaining that courts of appeals decisions
“are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases”).
326
See George, supra note 110, at 1695.
327
Cf. VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 19 (2006) (stating that unanimous decisions “may
promote institutional legitimacy and effective implementation of individual decisions”);
Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L.
REV. 859, 870 n.37 (2010) (“[U]nanimous decisions have more legitimacy.”).
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enhance the public’s view of the judiciary’s overall role in deciding election
disputes. Further, direct en banc review minimizes the potential back-and-forth
within a court system by eliminating the three-judge panel, which en banc courts
often reverse.328
Third, involving many judges in the decision-making process promotes
uniformity, which in turn leads to clarity, consistency, and judicial integrity.329 By
contrast, having appeals to three-judge panels invites the possibility that panel
decisions may be in tension with each other, undermining the public’s perception
of the court’s adherence to the rule of law.330 A direct appeal to the en banc court
focuses all of the court’s active judges on the case, thereby eliminating the
possibility of an intra-circuit conflict and removing the constraints of a prior
panel’s decision, particularly where the judges on the three-judge panel might
become entrenched in their positions or feel perturbed that their colleagues are
questioning their work at the en banc sitting.331 It also invites the full court to
decide whether it wishes to follow or reject another circuit’s decision on the same
or similar matter. Ultimately, because the stakes are higher in election law cases, a
majority decision after review by the entire court is more likely to enjoy support as
stemming from considered reasoning and analysis.332 As Justice Douglas once
explained, allowing courts to sit en banc “makes for more effective judicial
administration. Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in
the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted.”333
Fourth, the en banc process likely leads to the greatest possibility of
minimizing ideology—to the extent that is even feasible in the federal courts. As
328

See Brown, Jr. & Lee, supra note 115, at 1111 (observing that many circuit courts
take a case en banc to reverse a three-judge panel decision that the majority of judges find
too conservative).
329
See Stein, supra note 323, at 819–22 (advocating for greater use of en banc courts
to promote uniformity, avoid minority judges wielding too much power within the circuit,
and reduce cases that must go to the Supreme Court for resolution of circuit conflicts).
330
Id.; see also Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing
Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions,
70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 605, 613 (2003) (criticizing the federal court system for allowing
circuit splits to remain unanswered, as a lack of coherence and uniformity is unfair to all
litigants and undermines the federal court system’s legitimacy).
331
See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 217–18 (1999) (explaining that “[t]he en banc
case is of greater consequence than the more common panel case” because “it expends
greater judicial and litigant resources, exposes the parties and circuit to the possibility of a
splintered ruling, and removes some of the standard constraints on judicial decisionmaking
at the court of appeals level”).
332
See id. at 218 (observing that “[a] circuit court’s ability to sit en banc may work to
protect the integrity of circuit law and to reinforce institutional legitimacy by ensuring
consistency and conformity in decisionmaking,” but noting that frequent en banc sessions
also have negative consequences).
333
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 334–35
(1941).
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one scholar found, en banc courts at the macro-level are balanced: “Thus, the
institutional structure of the federal courts (collegiality and hierarchy) is successful
at achieving the goal of limiting or moderating the behavior of judges at the
intermediate appellate level.”334 This is particularly true because “strategic judges
restrain[] the power of ideology-driven judges.”335
No system in which judges obtain their seats through executive appointment
or election can eliminate all vestiges of ideology.336 But finding a structure that
minimizes the role of ideology as much as possible is vitally important for election
law decisions, which can be intrinsically partisan given that they shape the rules of
the game. Having all of a court’s appellate judges decide the case at least brings all
of the ideological viewpoints together in one court, which, one hopes, will balance
partisan motivations.337 As Professor Adrian Vermuele posits:
[A]t the level of multimember judicial panels such as the Supreme Court,
the court as a whole can constitute a system whose behavior differs from
the behavior of the individual judges who sit on the court. If the biases of
individual judges cut in different directions, the court as a whole can
behave as though all the judges are principled law-followers.338
By contrast, decisions by only a few judges might emanate from partisan
motives of those judges, especially if all of the judges on the panel share the same
political persuasion.339 Decisions of three-judge courts, for example, could be
chalked up to the partisan make-up of that particular panel, which may be different
from the partisan leanings of the judiciary as a whole. Direct en banc review, by
contrast, provides predictability to the litigants and society, as it ensures that the
decision (or, at least, society’s perception of the decision) is not dependent simply
on the random draw of the panel.340 If election law decisions remain partisan even
334

George, supra note 110, at 1695.
Id.
336
See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’
Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 171–72 (2009) (finding that judges facing retention
elections respond in their decisions to political pressure from both their constituency and
their opponents).
337
See, e.g., Stein, supra note 323, at 823 (“The diversity of [judges’] backgrounds
. . . add[s] to the general formula.”). But see Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of
Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008) (describing the barriers plaintiffs in punchcard ballot litigation face at the en banc level and positing, “[t]o the extent that federal
appellate courts now contain more conservative judges than liberal judges, the chances of
litigants using Bush v. Gore for successful election reform appear bleak”).
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Vermeule, supra note 59, at 39–40.
339
See Abramowicz, supra note 103, at 1604 (noting criticism of courts of appeals
and highlighting studies showing that “decisions of the courts of appeals are excessively
ideological”).
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See Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 291, 299 (2000) (“Under the random assignment system, parties can only
make reasonably accurate predictions after the three judges are assigned to their case.”). Of
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after direct en banc review, then that is a function of the overall partisanship of that
circuit, not the whims of the panel-selection process. To correct this systemic
partisanship, the electorate can elect a president of the opposite party in the hope
that that president will nominate judges of a different ideological persuasion.341
This is dissimilar from a randomly selected three-judge panel, which has nothing
inherent in its structure that deemphasizes the importance of that panel’s
ideological makeup. Ultimately, in a system in which ideology will always play a
part, involving more judges can at least temper the role of partisanship in the
decision-making process. En banc courts also have greater visibility than threejudge panels, so using full appellate courts can expose latent partisanship.342
The fifth laudable effect of merits-based direct en banc review is that, unlike
in the three-judge district court model of federal court decision making, this
procedure assigns judges their traditional roles: trial judges ensure that the proper
parties are before the court, make findings of fact, and determine if any legal
challenges are frivolous,343 and the en banc circuit court reviews the district court’s
factual findings (with the gloss of a “clear and convincing” or similar standard)
and resolves questions of law.344 This process preserves each type of judge’s
normal expertise. Assigning judges tasks with which they are already familiar

course, judges themselves would generally not admit that partisanship plays any role in
their decisions. But the public certainly believes that ideology is a vital factor in judicial
decision making. See Supreme Court Update, RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www
.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/mood_of_america_archive/supreme_court_
ratings/positives_hold_steady_for_supreme_court_negatives_are_down (showing that only
41% of voters believe the Supreme Court bases its decisions on the Constitution and legal
precedents and 56% believe that Justices have their own political agenda, while only 24%
say that Supreme Court justices are impartial).
341
See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Are Obama’s Judges Really Liberals?, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/21/090921fa_fact_toobin
(“Obama’s choice of judges reflects ferment in the world of legal liberalism, which is tied
ever more closely to the fate of Democrats in the executive and legislative branches of
government. Liberals who once saw judges as the lone protectors of constitutional rights
are now placing their hopes on elected politicians like Obama.”).
342
Cf. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2159, 2173–74 (1998) (explaining that a dissenting opinion can often serve to expose a
panel majority’s partisan biases).
343
Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (“[T]he District
Court, as required by § 437h(a), first made findings of fact and then certified the case
. . . .”); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193 n.14 (1981) (“A party seeking to
invoke § 437h must have standing to raise the constitutional claim. . . . [W]e do not
construe § 437h to require certification of constitutional claims that are frivolous.”);
Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court properly
refused to certify questions to the en banc court because the plaintiff lacked standing to
assert a challenge under § 437h).
344
Bread, 455 U.S. at 580 (noting that the district court certified the case to the en
banc panel to resolve the constitutional questions).
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promotes accuracy and legitimacy and assists in generating timely decisions. It
thus preserves judicial economy. One problem with the three-judge district court is
that it mangles judicial decision making in an effort to create something special
and unique. Placing judges in uncomfortable settings, however, is not the proper
way to specialize election law cases.
Finally, direct en banc review provides a symbolic signaling role, telling
litigants, the court, and even the public that these cases are especially important.
Indeed, circuit courts vote to hear cases en banc only to maintain uniformity of
decisions or if “the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”345
By requiring en banc review at the outset for election law cases, Congress can
signal the importance of election law decisions to the functioning of our
democracy. A court plays a greater institutional role when it involves all of its
judges in a case. Barring a requirement that the United States Supreme Court
decide every election law dispute (which itself would have its own problems
separate from any signaling effect), using en banc courts more often for election
law cases is the best way to recognize the importance of the judiciary’s role in
shaping this country’s elections.346
V. CONCLUSION
The public is immensely interested in elections, never more so than when the
race is close. Campaigns routinely ask the courts to construe the rules to each
candidate’s advantage. Even outside the context of an actual election, federal
courts decide numerous election law cases that have a profound influence on how
elections are run, thus impacting the scope of our representative democracy.
Whenever judges decide the constitutionality of an election provision or the reach
of campaign finance limitations, the courts are shaping the meaning of political
participation. But there has been little thought given to the processes by which
345

FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S.
247, 270–71 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (approving en banc decisions for cases
that are “extraordinary in scale—either because the amount involved is stupendous or
because the issues are intricate enough to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit”).
346
Professor Ned Foley has proposed the creation of a specialized election court to
resolve election disputes, which can eliminate partisan decision making. See Edward B.
Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, Practice, Policy, 18 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 378–79 (2007). A specialized election court might serve a strong
signaling role, telling litigants and the public that election cases are so important and
unique that they deserve their own court. It also could help to eliminate partisanship,
depending on the method of selecting judges. But such an election court would likely
eliminate one virtue of using general-jurisdiction judges in election law cases: generaljurisdiction judges are very familiar with evidence gathering and litigation tactics and can
bring their overall expertise in judicial decision making to election law cases. It thus might
make more sense for a specialized election court to hear only particular election cases, such
as post-election contests over the winner of an election. Moreover, expanding the use of en
banc courts is a more practicable and passable solution than creating a new court from
whole cloth for all election law disputes.

488

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

courts decide these cases, even though these procedures have a significant impact
on the litigation. By tying the particulars of a special election law process to the
goals we should strive to seek in enacting a procedure—such as through meritsbased direct en banc review—we can better arm the courts with the tools for fairly
and efficiently deciding election law cases.

